Exercise-Based Rights – The Very Idea  
David Alm

The material to be presented in this talk is an excerpt from a larger work in progress about moral rights. In that work I defend two main theses. The first is the value view, according to which, very roughly, a right is (or helps constitute) a value belonging to the right holder. The second is the thesis that rights are exercise based (EBR, for short), a preliminary formulation of which is that the value constituted by persons' rights belongs to them because of their right-violating and right-respecting actions. In this presentation I will try to arrive at a more precise version of EBR by discussing the pros and cons of various possible formulations.

Vagueness without Sorites Susceptibility  
Sam Carter

Vagueness and susceptibility to sorites reasoning appear intimately related. It is widely assumed – whether implicitly or explicitly – that an expression is vague if, and only if, it gives rise to sorites paradoxes. Endorsement of this biconditional is sometimes accompanied by the stronger claim that giving rise to a sorites paradox is constitutive of vagueness (e.g., Bueno and Colyvan (2012)). This paper challenges the biconditional (and, a fortiori, the constitution claim). A number of examples are given of vague expressions which are not susceptible to compelling sorites reasoning. I then consider various related putative necessary and sufficient conditions for vagueness and show them to either over-generate, under-generate, or both. Finally, I conclude by presenting a brief diagnosis of why accounts of vagueness which appeal to sorites reasoning fail in general.

Reasons and the Property of Being a Reason  
Andrés García & Jakob Green Werkmäster

In recent years the distinction between reasons and the normative property of being a reason has received increased attention by philosophers (e.g., Skorupski, 2010; Scanlon, 2014; Olson, 2015). The hope is that it can help illuminate some salient features of reasons, thereby freeing the normative domain from some of its apparent mystery. In what follows we hope to contribute to this trend by using the distinction to explain three normative phenomena: The first concerns the concept of enabling, which captures the relation between facts and the features that make it possible for facts to become reasons (Dancy, 2004). The second concerns the theory of subjectivism, which claims that reasons are dependent on our motivational
attitudes. The third concerns the concept of being normative in a derivative sense, which captures the relation that some reasons have to other, ostensibly more fundamental, reasons.

By drawing attention to the distinction, we hope to develop a pattern of explanation that interprets the aforementioned phenomena in terms of the grounds or makers of the normative property of being a reason. In other words, the pattern of explanation will be appealing to the relation that holds between reasons and the features in virtue of which, or as a result of which, certain facts are endowed with their normative status. Although we admit that there may be problems involved in coming to grips with this relation, we still believe that our pattern of explanation ends up with significant advantages over its main rivals. In particular, we believe that it manages to be relatively parsimonious, while still respecting the substantive intuitions that induced philosophers to be sensitive to the normative phenomena to begin with.

Do We Speak of the Same Witch? How Minds Can Meet on Intentional Identity
Justine Jacot (joint work with Peter Gärdenfors)

Intentional identity is a medieval semantic puzzle first developed in its modern form by Peter Geach. It occurs in statements containing different propositional attitudes about the same object of focus. According to Geach, it is impossible to render the logical form of such sentences, due to the presence, in an intentional clause, of an anaphoric pronoun referring to a term occurring in another intentional clause. The difficulty of the anaphora resolution is doubled by the ontological indeterminacy of the object of focus. Indeed, this object can be a fictional one, or an indeterminate class. So far, the solutions proposed have been centered on the analysis of the logical form of sentences with intentional identity, focusing on the mapping between propositional attitudes of different individuals. We discuss three kinds of mapping: counterparts, cross-identification, and Skolem functions, which all rely to different degrees on the use of a possible worlds semantics. We conclude that possible worlds are not the right tools to express the intentional identities. Instead, we propose a new solution using a semantics based on conceptual spaces. Expressions are interpreted as regions or points in the conceptual spaces of the individuals. The meanings of referring expressions, including intentional identities, are modeled as fixpoints based on prototypes in semantic mappings.

Asymmetrical Values of Fulfilling and Violating Duties
Holly M. Smith

It is standardly assumed that within a deontological moral theory fulfilling an obligation has positive deontic value while violating such an obligation has negative value. In prior work I have argued that we must abandon this assumption for duties, such as the duty to fulfill a given promise, which we create. In this paper I extend this argument to show we must abandon this assumption for noncreated as well as for created duties. This implies that the fulfilment of any duty has no more deontic value than the performance of a morally neutral act, such as tying one’s left rather than one’s right shoe first.

Phenomenal Character as a Mental Activity
Susanna Schellenberg

I argue that phenomenal character is the product of a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which phenomenal character is analyzed in terms of
peculiar entities or relations to peculiar entities—be they phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.

**Resurrecting the Causal Theory of Knowledge in a Virtue Epistemic Framework**  
Austin A. Baker

Within this paper, I will defend a hybrid account of knowledge, resurrecting Goldman’s Causal Theory of Knowledge within a virtue-epistemic framework. To construct the theory I have chosen to examine to accounts of knowledge incorporate virtue-theoretic conditions – Duncan Pritchard’s ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ and John Greco’s ‘Knowledge and Success from Ability’. These are by no means the only virtue theories on offer but outlining the theories of and dialogue between Pritchard and Greco will help us sketch what a successful virtue theory of knowledge would contend with. In chapter two, I shall discuss the epistemic role of dispositional beliefs and an account of knowledge-conducive belief formation, which will become relevant in the discussion of knowledge in the final chapter. Finally, within chapter three, I will present my causal-virtue hybrid account of knowledge, which I will call the ‘Causal Account of Virtue Epistemology’ (hereafter, ‘CAVE’). I shall conclude by asserting that CAVE is a satisfactory account of knowledge that overcomes Pritchard’s objections to Greco’s Knowledge and Success from Ability and captures our intuitions about knowledge more thoroughly than Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.

**Hypothetical Consent and the Non-Identity Problem: Why a Denial of the Worse-off Principle Cannot Solve the Paradox**  
M. Beth Henzel

Since Parfit put forth an impersonal account to explain the Non-Identity Problem, some have sought ways to reject his conclusion. In particular, Harman, Hanser, and Woodward have argued for a person-affecting account by denying the worse-off principle. However, a rejection of this principle is insufficient to reach the conclusion that person-affecting reasons can ground impermissibility in non-identity cases. Even granting the premises of these authors, the conclusion is not warranted because - in some cases – it is appropriate to impute consent to the future individuals, negating the normative force of the harm they suffer or of the prima facie violation of their rights. In these cases, consent cancels the person-affecting reasons against choosing the alleged impermissible action in non-identity cases. The accounts considered are thus incomplete solutions to the Non-Identity Problem.

**Are experimental surveys relevant to the Theory of Reference?**  
Oscar Ralsmark

Are experimental surveys relevant to the Theory of Reference? Against the background of the conviction that this cannot be decided until it has been established what its apposite research program is, two dominant twentieth-century programs – the “Eidetic” and the “Intentionalistic” – are contrasted on the basis of what kind of facts they take to determine what the true theory of reference is. Regarding Eidetic Theory of Reference, two varieties – one Platonic, one Aristotelian – are then contrasted on the basis of what they take to be the proper method for justifying theories of reference. While the question of what program is preferable is left open, it is argued that experimental surveys are relevant to Intentionalistic and Aristotelian-Eidetic Theory of Reference only. However, since the latter has been a minor actor on the playboard, it is also maintained that the former is the only program of significance to which they are relevant. That this is the proper way to approach the issue is
realised neither by those experimental philosophers who have denounced the Theory of Reference as such, nor by those philosophers that have defended themselves against that challenge. One upshot is that there is no such convincing denouncement.

**Induction and Knowledge-What**
Peter Gärdenfors (joint work with Andreas Stephens)

Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between *properties* and *categories*. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the tripartition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.