Meaning has correctness conditions
from is to ought:
The fact that a speaker means something by a term \( t \) determines that she ought to apply the term to \( f \)
i.e., what someone means by a term determines how she ought to use it
to describe how things are,
or
to prescribe what to do

**Meaning Platitude**
if \( t \) means \( F \) then (x) (\( t \) applies correctly to x iff x is \( f \))

Does following a rule to mean sth by a term make meaning normative?
-- Only if the rule is prescriptive, as opposed to descriptive.

**The Prescriptivity Principle**
if I mean \( f \) by \( t \) then I ought to apply \( t \) to something iff it is an \( f \)

Speakers ought to speak the truth

**Hypothetical prescription/obligation**
means-end
if goal G, (to achieve G) then do A \( /G \) is optional/

**Categorical prescription/obligation**
the consequent is a condition of the antecedent \( /is \) entailed by/

**Pragmatics**
When not speaking the truth does not amount to making a mistake
exs. tell a lie; be ironic; metaphor; sarcasm; …

However I use term \( t \), it will be correct in application to something iff it is a \( f \).
To add that I ought to apply \( t \) only if it is correct to do so is empty (vacuous).
**Norms and Social Practice** e.g. Brandom
Meaning is social
Correctness conditions depend on communal agreement
Communal agreement creates obligation, like promising /cf. illocutionary speech act, Austin and Searle/

Discursive normative statuses concern commitment and entitlement that the use of concepts involve. Discursive norms are instituted by social practices.
- language and intentionality are normative
- such norms are understood in terms of practices (pragmatism)
- such norms are essentially social

AH: But why think there are semantic obligations of this kind??

**The Contractual Theory of Understanding** e.g. Kripke, Wright, McDowell
"to learn the meaning of a term is to acquire an understanding that obliges us subsequently to judge and speak in certain determinate ways”

in order to mean something by \( t \) the speaker must be committed not merely to use \( t \) in the standard way, but to actually meet the standard /the speaker must not fail to meet it/

HA: This assumption makes it impossible to use language to lie

**HA Conclusion**: Semantic rules are meaning constituting, but semantic rules are not prescriptive.