

Analysing personal value^{*}

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It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard *analysandum*) if the *analysans* is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person *a*, if and only if there is reason to favour it for *a*'s sake (where "favor" is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least *pro tanto*) justified in our concern for objects that are *valuable for us*; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.

Certain things we value are best described as carrying impersonal value, i.e., they are valued with no eye to anything but to the thing itself; other things appear to carry a different kind of value: they are seemingly personal rather than impersonal in nature. They are examples of so-

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called value-for rather than value period. It is an important question, albeit not one that I will address here, what things have these sorts of value. My objective is in a sense a more fundamental one, viz., to offer an analysis of personal value. Since I will have little to say on the substantive issue of what things are of personal value, let me at the outset list some examples of reasonable bearers of personal value: my daughter's first poem, my father's tombstone, a smell that triggers off (a Proustian) memory (notably from a period of my life that I had forgotten all about), pleasures that I experience, etc. Hopefully, these few examples suffice to give a clear hint of what I have in mind.

Intuitively the distinction between the personal and the impersonal captures something important about our everyday notion of the valuable.¹ Nonetheless, philosophy of value has focused most of its attention on impersonal value. Personal values have aroused much less interest among value theorists. This reflects something quite reasonable, namely, that impersonal values are more important from a moral point of view than personal values. Perhaps it also reflects a certain distrust of the very concept of personal value. Of course, if all it carried with it was the idea that something is valuable *according to* a person, then this scepticism is justified. However, I think there is much more to this notion than that, which I will try to make plausible by offering a novel analysis of these examples.²

A caveat is in place here. There is by now a quite extensive literature analysing at least some of the kind of examples above in terms of so-called *agent-relative reasons*. The analysis outlined in this paper is *not* an attempt to understand agent-relative reasons. Rather, it is intended to suggest a way of understanding the kind of values that accrue to objects like those mentioned earlier. I have two reasons for suggesting an analysis of these values that does not rely on the notion of agent-relative reasons, as this notion is understood in the literature. First, the notion of agent-relative reasons is generally recognized as being problematic;³ in the light of this, it is important to examine possible alternatives to it. Second, and more important, even

¹ A referee raised the question whether the distinction between personal and impersonal values is the only exemplification of the distinction between value period and value for. I suspect there are other examples. However, this is nothing that I will argue in this paper.

² Not everyone agrees that there is an interesting sense of personal value. For instance, Scanlon does seem to be implying this when he says about what it means to value one's children: "it is natural to say, and would be odd to deny, that I value my children; but it would be odd for me to put this by saying that they are valuable (except in the sense that everyone is)"; see T. M., Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 95. I think Scanlon is wrong here. I think there is a third way of understanding that the children are valuable, or have value for me, and this paper is an attempt to outline this view.

³ In a near future I hope to show just why we have reason to be suspicious about the notion of an agent-relative reason.

if we solved the problems connected with this notion, it does not constitute a convincing analysis of personal values. There is something intuitively odd about the idea that the nature of value is relative. G. E. Moore saw this, as we shall see in section I. However, his scepticism about the idea of there being private values (in addition to impersonal, public values) led him to the mistaken conclusion that we should give up the idea of notion of good-for altogether. If we could analyse the values involved in the aforementioned cases in such a way that they come out in a clear sense as personal values (as value-for or good-for some person) that we all have a reason to favour (in a wide sense of the term that will be explained later on), we would have, in my view, a more appealing account. Understanding value in terms of agent-relative reasons, as this notion is traditionally understood, makes personal values too private; they become inert, *qua* values, for everyone else except for the person for whom they are good-for. Perhaps there are such private values. The analysis which I am about to offer would then account for only one of the senses of good-for, and not for when we think, for instance, an object *O* is good-for a person *a*, just in case *a* has an agent-relative reason to, say, favour or promote *O* in some sense. Here my aim is to argue that there are values that can be characterized as personal, but which nonetheless give everyone a reason to take up certain attitudes vis-à-vis the bearer of value; I do so by suggesting that examples such as the ones mentioned earlier are open to a fitting-attitude analysis of a particular kind.

In what follows, I shall take the idioms ‘value-for’ and ‘good-for’ as referring to personal values. ‘Good-for’ will be considered as referring to a positive value-for, ‘bad-for’ to a negative value-for. Sometimes the context makes it obvious what ‘value-for’ is referring to. On the occasions that it stands for, say, a positive personal value, I will treat it as a synonym for ‘good-for’. However, it must be emphasized that there might be ‘value-for’ expressions that do not easily lend themselves to this kind of “synonymy”. But if there are such expressions they are not of any major relevance to what I will be saying here.⁴

1. Moore’s rejection

In his much-discussed attack on egoism in *Principia Ethica*,⁵ G. E. Moore expresses great scepticism regarding certain ways of understanding the expressions ‘my own good’ and ‘good for me’:

⁴ But see here p. 18 where I discuss the likely possibility that a complex notion such as ‘good-for’ is in fact ambiguous.

⁵ For a classic and quite devastating objection to Moore’s attempt to show that the doctrine of egoism is self-contradictory, see C. D. Broad’s “Moore’s Ethical Doctrines” in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Phi-*

What then is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be *good for me*? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which can belong to me, which can be mine, is something which is good, and not the fact that it is good.⁶

The passage is bewildering (perhaps especially as it comes from Moore). First, Moore is of course right that the *fact* that something is good is not something that can belong to me. Facts are not the kind of objects that can be in someone’s possession. But to admit this does not force us to say that ‘my own’ in ‘my own good’ cannot refer to anything but the object that is valuable, and not the value itself. It is quite surprising that Moore in the first place takes our relation to facts to be an issue. It is hard to believe that any of Moore’s opponents would actually disagree with Moore on this matter.⁷

It is important to underline that Moore cannot simply assume there are no facts about ‘my own good’. Moore has not given us any reason why there cannot be two different kinds of value facts, namely, that something is good period (for everyone), and another that something is good for person *p*. The states of affairs involved in these two cases may well, once they obtain, constitute two different kinds of facts.

Here is Moore’s own conclusion as to what we can mean by ‘my own good’:

When I talk of a thing as ‘my own good’ all that I can mean is that something which will be exclusively mine ... is also *good absolutely*; or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely. The good of it can in no possible sense be ‘private’ or belong to me; any more than a thing can exist privately.⁸

Again, if it is not merely that it is mine or that it exists that is valuable, but the thing itself that is valuable, then Moore hasn’t shown that the value of such an entity cannot in an interesting sense be private.⁹ If there is something like a peculiar “good-for fact”, then it will be a

osophy of G. E. Moore (The Library of Living Philosophers), (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1942).

⁶ Moore, G. E. (1993, 1903), *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, revised edition), p. 150

⁷ It might be that Moore did not have more in mind when he finished the passage quoted with the words “...and not the fact that it is good” than to say “goodness is not something that can belong to a person”. Whether or not this is true, it doesn’t change anything regarding what Moore accomplishes argumentatively.

⁸ Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 150.

⁹ For an argument to the effect that it is things rather than the existence of these things that carry value, see Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sake,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 100(1), (2000), pp. 33–49, and “Tropic of Value,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66, (2003a), pp. 389–403.

fact for everyone, since facts are not the kind of thing that can be in someone's possession. But this should not prevent us from saying that the fact contains some "private" element that makes it distinguishable from facts involving good absolutely.

Moore's objection to understanding 'my own good' as anything but 'that which is exclusively mine carries an absolute good', must be understood in the light of his criticism of egoism – a view he believes he can refute. Moore is not easy to follow here, but a core idea concerning his objection to 'my own good' seems to be a claim to the following effect:

- (1) To be a good at all, the good must be (a) good in itself, i.e. an intrinsic goodness, and (b) a "universal good". (cf. pp. 150–151)¹⁰

Moore's famous attack on egoism and the idea of a 'good-for me', which runs over several paragraphs, boils down to this very idea that to be a "good at all" the good must be a universal intrinsic good. However, he does not support it – at least not in any strong way. Therefore, the attack is in effect not so much of an argument as an assumption that Moore is asking us to relate to. He has not given us any convincing reason why the notion good-for should be rejected

2. Fitting attitude analysis of value

It should be expected of any serious analysis of personal value that it addresses the following two questions: In what sense is personal value *a value*? And in what sense is this alleged value *personal*?

In this section I outline the general traits of an influential pattern of analysis which I think gives a plausible account of value, one, moreover, which personal value can be subsumed under – all we need to do is to fine-tune the analysans. The tradition of analysis that I have in mind goes back at least to Franz Brentano, and counts among its advocates prominent figures such as C. D. Broad, A. C. Ewing, and more recently Thomas Scanlon.¹¹ The key idea behind this *fitting-attitude analysis* (FA, for short)¹² is that axiological concepts such as 'value' and 'goodness' must be analysed in terms of deontic notions.

¹⁰ The notion of a 'universal good' is left undefined. A natural interpretation (especially since he is discussing Sidgwick's view on the matter) is that he has in mind "everyone's good".

¹¹ Franz Brentano, *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969 [1889]); C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), A. C. Ewing, *The Definition of Good* (London: Macmillan, 1947), and Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*.

¹² See Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, (2004), "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value," *Ethics* 114 (2004), pp. 391–424, in which we examine this kind of analysis in detail.

FA analyses reduces the evaluative to deontic claims about attitudes towards the valuable objects in question that it is *fitting* or that one *ought* to or that we have *reason* to take up towards the objects. Note that the deontic element does not refer to a moral ought or a moral reason (A. C. Ewing, one of the founding fathers of the FA pattern of analysis distinguished the ‘ought of fittingness’ from the ‘moral ought’; the analysis is formulated in terms of the former, not the latter).¹³ Another noteworthy feature, according to the more interesting versions of FA, is that it is properties *other than* the value property that provide reasons to respond to the thing by taking up some attitude.¹⁴ The reason we ought to take a certain responsive stance is to be looked for among the subvenient properties and not in what supervenes on those properties. Following Scanlon¹⁵ we could say that what carries the buck is not value but what value supervenes on! In other words, to be valuable is to have the property of having a value-making base that gives us reason to hold a pro-response vis-à-vis the valuable object.

Most versions of the FA analysis, including the one defended in this work, are “value bearer pluralists”, i.e., they acknowledge that final value may accrue to different kinds of objects, such as abstract states of affairs and concrete objects (say, persons); monists maintain that fundamentally there is only one *kind* of object – often some propositional-like object such as states of affairs or facts that carry value.¹⁶ Monists need not claim about value bearers, of course, that there is only one kind of attitude relevant for value analysis. However, they will only analyse (non-derivative) value in terms of attitudes the object of which corresponds with what the monist considers a possible bearer of value. For instance, monists who think that

¹³ In *Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 86, 90, he modifies his position. In this latter work, he interprets the “ought of fittingness” as an “ought of reasonableness”.

¹⁴ Another version of the FA analysis considers fittingness (worthiness, correctness) to be a primitive that cannot be subsumed under the standard generic deontic notion, which includes notions such as ‘ought’, ‘must’ and ‘should’. Fittingness constitutes on this view a special kind of deontic notion. Ewing, for instance, took this standpoint in his early work *The Definition of Good*.

¹⁵ Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*.

¹⁶ See for instance, Elisabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), Christine Swanton, “Profiles of the Virtues,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 27 (1995), 335–344, Marcia W. Baron, “Kantian Ethics,” in Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote (eds.), *Three Methods of Ethics* (Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1997), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “Tropic of Value,” pp. 389–403. For monist approaches see Noah M. Lemos, *Intrinsic Value, Concept and Warrant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994); Michael J. Zimmerman, *The Nature of Intrinsic Value* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001a), and “Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth,” in Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), *Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001b), pp. 123–38; and Jonas Olson, “Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (2003), pp. 412–22.

only states of affairs carry value will not employ in their analysis an attitude that does not take some states of affairs as its object (say, to honour a person).¹⁷

Pluralists, on the other hand, stress that different kinds of valuable objects invite different kinds of pro-responses. For instance, a brave person ought to be admired, a precious artefact calls for care and protection, and a desirable state should be desired. In fact, in many cases we may describe the response that is fitting more accurately as a conglomerate of different kinds of attitudes or even attitudes-cum-behaviours. Some of these attitudes are especially thing- or person-oriented attitudes: we care for, say, our children; we cherish and preserve an object of historical importance, say, the Magna Charta, or we protect a part of the Brazilian rainforest that is untouched by humans. Other attitudes are rather *state of affairs*-oriented. The most obvious example is desires, which typically take states of affairs (e.g., *that* Spain will qualify for the World Cup) as their objects rather than (concrete) things and persons.

The FA analysis has typically been employed to analyse what is valuable “for its own sake” or “as an end” or has value “in its own right”. However, none of these “idioms” is in fact quite satisfactory. That something is valuable as an end, for instance, appears not to be consistent with the idea that the value bearer may be a non-propositional object, such as a thing (painting, stamp, etc.). It seems right, at least, to agree with Ross that ends are objectives and never things. In this sense, the two latter expressions seem to be better. Both “in its own right”¹⁸ and “for its own sake” imply something about whether the value is dependent or not on something else than the valuable object. Of these two expressions, I prefer “for its own sake”. Admittedly, the advantage of this idiom may not be immediately obvious. There is a somewhat counter-intuitive ring to it when it occurs in expressions such as “x is valuable for its own sake” (in comparison to, say, “x is desired for its own sake”). Notwithstanding, I prefer this latter alternative. In line with others, I will refer to it as final value; my reason is that it is a natural counterpart (in a sense which “in its own right” is not) to two other familiar kinds of value, viz., contributory value and instrumental value, i.e., what is valuable for the sake of some whole or for something else’s sake rather than for its own sake. Moreover, “valuable for

¹⁷ For a collection of recent articles by monists as well as pluralists, see Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman, *Recent Work on Intrinsic Value*, (Dordrecht: Springer 2005).

¹⁸ That something is valuable in its own right might lead one’s thoughts to the idea that the object has value in virtue of some ability or capacity of the object that has been realized. In that case, this kind of value would also exclude, it seems, certain objects from the field of value bearers. (Would, say, a state of affairs have value in its own right in this sense?). “Own right” also seems to suggest that the value that accrues to an object “in its own right” does so without the help of a subject. This suggests that the expression lends itself more easily to an objectivist analysis of value.

its own sake” is not biased regarding the value-bearer issue; it does not rule out either abstract states or concrete things as was the case with at least the first alternative. Therefore, in what follows I will speak of final values in terms of what is valuable for its own sake. However, my aim here concerns in a sense only indirectly final values. What I want to discuss is to what extent some version of the FA analysis, *if true*, is helpful when it comes to understanding personal values.

The above proviso, ‘if true’, must be underlined. Recently Wlodek Rabinowicz and I have argued that, despite its many advantages, FA faces some serious problems.¹⁹ However, my aim here is not to solve these problems. I have a much more modest end in sight, namely, to argue that if this analysis overcomes these problems it will help us understand the difference between impersonal and personal values.

For reasons of simplicity let “favour” be a schematic place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by different kinds of valuable objects. Applied to final values, FA then says, as we have seen, that an object is finally valuable if there is reason to favour it for its own sake. An object of instrumental value is then said to be instrumentally valuable if there is reason to favour it for its effects’ sake.²⁰

Final values understood in terms of FA suit well as examples of *impersonal* values – at least if by “impersonal” we have in mind values that are not related to any particular person or persons. After all, it is in virtue of the non-evaluative properties of the valuable object – and not some property of, say, the evaluator – that we should take an attitudinal stance, and these

¹⁹ See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon: On fitting pro-attitudes and Value,”. One difficulty is the so-called *Wrong Kind of Reasons problem*, to wit, the problem consisting in distinguishing those reasons that bear on evaluation from those that do not. We may well have reasons to have, say, pro-attitudes that are satisfactory but nonetheless wrong from the point of view of the FA analysis. If a bully with low self-esteem tells me to appreciate him for his own sake under a threat of severe punishment, I have, it seems, a perfectly understandable reason to appreciate him. Given the threat, I ought to appreciate him. Notwithstanding, it doesn’t seem right to conclude that the bully is valuable. The analytical problem of separating those reasons that are of the right kind from those that are not ought to put a damper on the enthusiasm of the FA advocates. Cf. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, and their “conflation problem” in their “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61 (2000a), pp. 65–90, see also their “Sentiment and Value,” *Ethics* 110 (2000b), pp. 722–48, and “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism),” in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), *Philosophy and the Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an attempt to solve the problem, see Jonas Olson “Buck-passing and the Wrong kind of Reasons,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 54 (2004), pp. 295–300; see also the reply by Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons – A Reply to Olson,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* (forthcoming).

²⁰ For some complications concerning the notion of instrumental value, see Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 5, (2002), pp. 23–43.

properties will call for such a response regardless of who we are. This is obviously the case when final value accrues to the object in virtue of its internal properties (a so-called *intrinsic* final value). It is also the case when we turn to so-called *extrinsic* final value – where the final (in contrast to instrumental) value supervenes on an object in virtue of at least some of its (non-internal) relational properties. The spirit of the analysis prompts us to regard such values as calling forth that *one* ought to favour the object for its own sake in virtue of its non-evaluative intrinsic as well as extrinsic properties. Just think of Kagan’s example of a stamp that is unique. The uniqueness of the stamp is an obvious (non-internal) relational property of a potent value-making character.²¹ The uniqueness gives us a reason to, say, cherish and protect the stamp.

3. Approaching the analysis of personal value

It might be thought that the notion of extrinsic final values opens way for an analysis of personal value. Thus, according to what I will refer to as the *De Facto Attitude analysis of Personal Value*, or DEFA for short, personal values constitute a subgroup of extrinsic values. DEFA is not a good approach to personal value. However, it might prove useful to glance at an alternative that goes wrong in order to be able to appreciate duly the more serious suggestion presented in the next section.

DEFA is arrived at by the following path: If final values can be extrinsic, i.e., accrue (at least in part) to objects in virtue of their non-internal relational properties, then it will be expected that some object of extrinsic value will carry this kind of value in virtue of its relation to a particular *person*. Once value is relativized to persons in this way, the stage has been set for an analysis of personal values: we need next to specify the relation more carefully on to which personal value accrues. This must be done in order to distinguish personal value from other kinds of extrinsic values that accrue to objects in virtue of being merely related to a person. Intuitively, it seems credible that personal value refers to something more than merely a value that is related to a person. We need, that is, to analytically separate from each other cases like, for instance, the following ones: Napoleon’s hat, and a drawing made by my 5-year-old daughter.

²¹ Shelly Kagan, in “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” *The Journal of Ethics*, 2, (1998), pp. 277–97, does not refer himself to these values as final values, but that is a mere terminological issue. The point is that he thinks something can be valuable for its own sake in virtue of some relational property. For other examples see, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sake,” pp. 33–49.

It is plausible to argue that Napoleon's hat has some final, impersonal extrinsic value.²² Even if Napoleon never endorsed any evaluative judgement whatsoever about his hat it might still be of value due to the fact that it was a historically important person's well-known hat.

In the case of my daughter's drawing, it is unlikely that it has impersonal value. It appears rather to be a likely carrier of personal value. Suppose we accept these examples. The question then is, how should we account for the difference? What makes the first example into one of "impersonal value" and the other one into one of "personal value"?

The role that Napoleon played in the past, and my and my daughter's historical insignificance, may account for why the hat carries impersonal value, and why the drawing does not. But these facts do not account for why the drawing and not the hat has *personal* value. Here we need to look for something else.

A natural suggestion would be to search for something special about the two objects involved in the drawing example, i.e., the drawing, *O*, and the person, *a*, for whom, ex hypothesi, the drawing is a personal value. On the face of it, it is likely that *a*, as a matter of fact favours the drawing. DEFA could but need not be cast in some kind of fitting-analysis mould, in which case it would say something to the following effect: *O* has personal value for *a* if and only if we ought to favour *O* in virtue of the extrinsic property that *O* is de facto favoured by *a*.

Thus, my daughter's drawing would have personal value only if the value accrued to it in virtue of being an object that is favoured (say, cherished, esteemed, etc.) by me, *a*.

But despite whatever intuitive appeal DEFA has, it establishes *at most* that the value accruing to the drawing has a *relative* value. And that is not specific enough if it is personal values we are looking for.²³ Personal values are in some sense relative values – they are values-for and as such their analysis requires the mentioning of the person for whom they are values (for) – but relative values are certainly not necessarily personal values. In other words, al-

²² Cf., Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," pp. 277–97, and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sake," pp. 33–49.

²³ It might be objected that DEFA need only make an additional and quite reasonable claim, namely, that we should regard the attitude of *a* as having *value-constitutive powers*. This would amount to a subjectivist version of DEFA. This might well be true. However, as long as the issue between subjectivism and objectivism has not been settled in any convincing way, I will let the analysis reflect this by formulating a neutral analysis. See my "Subjectivism and Objectivism: An Outline," in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), *Pattern of Values: Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis* (Lund: Lund Philosophy Reports, 2003), pp. 246–63, in which I suggest how the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism should be understood.

though the inference from “*x* is a personal value” to “*x* is a relative value” is valid, reversing the entailment is invalid.

There are two more reasons why we should regard DEFA with scepticism. It identifies personal values exclusively among extrinsic (final) values. But this seems to be an arbitrary restriction. An account that includes intrinsic values is more appealing. Moreover, it is not obviously a necessary condition for something to be a personal value that it is valued by the person for whom it is a value. A convincing case could be made, albeit on substantial grounds, for the idea that despite the fact that an object is not valued (esteemed, cherished, etc.) by a particular person, it nonetheless has personal value for him.²⁴

4. Fitting-analysis of personal value

The approach to be outlined next carries, I think, intuitive appeal. In part the attractiveness derives from its idea that personal value calls for a range of a particular kind of attitudes. Something about these attitudes makes it understandable why objects related to these attitudes carry personal rather than impersonal value. This is one important advantage. But there are more. By situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis, as will become evident in a moment, admits that this kind of value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. It thereby avoids the problem that Moore, for instance, worried about, namely, that we would have two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and one to personal value. In both cases an object is, say, positively valuable, on the analysis suggested here, if it has a value-making property that gives us reason to hold a pro-response vis-à-vis it. What distinguishes personal value from other kinds of value is the sort of attitude involved.

A third positive feature is that the analysis elucidates why we are (although not necessarily “all things considered”) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as FA has it, the existence of (at least pro tanto) reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.²⁵ A further advantage is that it lives up to a formal re-

²⁴ I discuss one such example in the next section.

²⁵ Notice, if the analysis is in terms of pro-tanto reasons our analysis will be one of a pro-tanto value and not of an all-things-considered value. That we value a certain feature of an object does not imply that we necessarily ascribe value to the whole object itself. For instance, although I might value (in this respect) the ingenuity of a certain cunning crime, I would nonetheless not call it good. Again, we may value a certain colour, but its presence in a certain painting might well make the painting not valuable, and even awful. Just how we should balance the reasons called for by an object that is valu-

quirement; it is silent as to what objects carry personal values. Thereby, it avoids compromising itself evaluatively. Substantial reasoning will hopefully give us an answer to what things carry personal value, but this is not the aim of formal axiology. Moreover, its appeal is not conditional on our taking sides on a controversial issue such as the subjectivism/objectivism (descriptivist/non-descriptivist, cognitivist/non-cognitivist, etc.) question; the analysis is open to any of these positions – it all depends on how the deontic operator in the analysis is understood eventually.

To introduce the analysis, consider the following list of final and instrumental attitudes, i.e., the attitudes referred to in (i) and (ii):

- (i) x favours O for its own sake.
- (ii) x favours O for some other object's sake...

I suggest we add to this list the following entry:

- (iii) x favours O for y 's sake.

The idea that we favour things for our *own sake* is, I take it, uncontroversial (I may, say, desire to know whether or not I have a fatal illness, for my own sake, but be absolutely indifferent to whether someone else ought to have this knowledge). The real nub of the issue concerns to what extent ' x favours O for y 's sake' is shorthand for

- (iv) ' x favours O for its own sake, for y 's sake', or
- (v) ' x favours O for some other object's sake, for y 's sake'?

Suppose there are only final and instrumental attitudes. Then (iii) must be an example of either a kind of final or an instrumental attitude, or not be an attitude at all. But is it at all possible to favour, for example, O for its own sake, for a 's sake? And if it is possible, how should these attitudes be understood?

At least two features of (iv–v) complicate an evaluation of these suggestions. First, 'favours' is here a technical term that covers a wide range of attitudes. So what might be possible with regard to one kind of attitude, may be impossible with regard to some other kind of response. This is not the place to make any examination of all the different attitudes covered

able in some respects, indifferent or even disvaluable in other respects, is a complicated issue. For a more detailed discussion see here Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro Attitudes and Value", p. 418; and "Tropic of Value," pp. 398–399. I am indebted to a referee for raising this issue.

by “favour”; we should therefore keep a lookout for questionable generalizations on this matter. Second, the fact that the formulations in (iv–v) are somewhat obnoxious by their very cumbersome nature might make us reluctant to accept them as coherent. But, of course, the fact that we need a cumbersome formulation to catch a complex mental state is in itself no reason to dismiss these attitudes on logical grounds. I will assume in this work that there are these multifarious attitudes. There is, in fact, ample evidence that we do describe ourselves as having such attitudes. When we for instance treat a stranger amicably for a friend’s sake – the stranger is, say, a friend of our friend – we are exhibiting this sort of attitude. The same holds when, on learning that someone whom we care about has had good fortune, we are glad for his or her sake. Many more examples could be given.

Although I am assuming that we can have these attitudes, I am far from sure how they are best analysed. Displaying them seems to involve our ability to harbour attitudes for someone else’s sake. This, by the way, seems to be an important part of what it means to be empathic. To recognize that something is of personal value to x is, on this line of reasoning, to somehow echo for a reason a favouring that x has or ought to have vis-à-vis the object of value for x ’s sake. One might object that taking this route will strand us with two notions of personal value: one employable only by the person for whom something is a personal value and another for those who recognize that something carries this person’s personal value. Actually I am convinced that this need not be the case. The attitude that I am ready to take towards, say, the stranger who is a friend of a friend of mine – call him a – has something to do with my friend’s attitudes towards the stranger. But it is hardly his *de facto* favouring that I will “take over”. Rather, it is the kind of attitude that a has reason to take in those circumstances – a reason which has met my approval. If this is the case I see no reason why a ’s claim that something has personal value should not be analysed in the same way.

These speculations apart, one can easily expect – with the focus on *final* rather than instrumental pro-responses – the following response: Make up your mind – either you favour O for its own sake or you favour it for your own sake. You cannot have it both ways. Actually, I am quite convinced that we can have the cake and eat it too. I have at least failed to determine a single precise content of “ a ’s sake” that is not combinable with “for its own sake”. This seems to suggest that ‘sake’ is in fact ambiguous: it does not necessarily have the same content in ‘for its own sake’ as it has in ‘for a ’s sake’.

Part of the perplexity which the expression in question gives rise to derives from a particular way of reading ‘sake’. Speaking about a ’s sake and O ’s sake might suggest that I am as-

cribing, at least to the former, a sake or an end, in the sense of an *objective*. But, as I suggested at the outset, the kind of final value which I am interested in accrues to objects that often cannot be understood as having objectives (e.g. like my daughter's poem). Therefore, in the case *O* is carrying a final personal value, the first 'sake' in "favouring *O* for its own sake for *a*'s sake" indicates that the value is not conducive to something else that is valuable; final value is perhaps best described then as an *end-point value* or an *ultimate value*;²⁶ this sort of value does not depend on something else being valuable. And similarly, the second 'sake' indicates that the favouring attitude is not instrumental; our attitude is for *a*, and it is final in the sense that it is not dependent on some other favouring. An attitude having the attainment of some objective as its object will only be relevant to an analysis of personal final value in case the attainment of the objective is favoured for the person's sake.²⁷

Understanding the attitude 'favouring *O* for its own sake for *a*'s sake' in terms of the 'end/objective' sense, might well be incoherent. Certainly, it would be reasonable to ask for more details about the 'objective' which persons might be said to have. However, in the 'end-point value' sense, there is nothing strange about 'sake' referring to one set of properties in the case of *O*, and another set of properties in *a*'s case. Why a particular set of properties supply us with a reason to finally favour something for a person's sake, is ultimately an evaluative issue that requires substantive justification (For instance, think of the hedonist who only acknowledges that certain kinds of experiences are finally valuable; such a person will reject alleged examples of final personal values that are said to accrue to other things than experiences of pleasure).

5. "For a particular person's sake"

If the suggestion about the aforementioned attitudes holds good, we now have the means of analysing personal values in a novel way. In what follows I will, unless needed, speak of 'favouring' without specifying the kind of favouring involved (i.e., whether or not it is final or instrumental). This simplifying measure must not be looked upon as a fraudulent attempt to sweep away the complex problems behind the expressions "*final attitude*" and "*instrumental*

²⁶ CF., Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sake," p. 48.

²⁷ Our finally favouring attitude may take persons as objects in two important ways; the persistence of the favouring might be conditional on the (contingent) properties of the person, or it might not. In the latter case, we favour something for *a*'s sake, regardless of or despite *a*'s properties (as when we love someone period). I think the analysis is open to both kinds of attitudes, but it is not something that I will argue here.

attitude”. I would be the first to recognize the need to establish a more precise meaning of this pair of notions.²⁸ Nonetheless, to avoid the clumsy “favour *O* for its own sake for something else’s sake” I will keep to the simpler “favour *O*”.

Now, formal analysis should not pick out any value-making properties. Doing so would be to evaluatively compromise it.²⁹ It is a matter of substantive and not formal value theory to determine which things have value. Of course, in some cases there is more agreement than in other cases as to what sort of things are in fact valuable. For instance, writers on welfare tend to agree that the presence of a certain kind of experiential states is a condition for welfare. However, they do disagree about whether it is a sufficient condition. There is also no consensus among welfare theorists as to what is the proper bearer of welfare: is it the mental states of a person at a given time? Is it the life of a person (where, say, the life contains welfare just in case it contains more of, say, certain experiences than of other kind of experiences). No formal inquiry will settle these issues. Still, it is at least possible for classificatory reasons to wall in a range of what is typically considered as *bona fide* welfare-making properties of a person *a*, in virtue of which we can reasonably favour *O* for *a*’s sake whether or not the pro-response is final or instrumental.

²⁸ In “Buck-passing Personal Value,” in David Chan (ed.), *Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology* (forthcoming), I explore the possibility of analysing final “favouring” of *O* in terms of an evaluative *judgement* to the effect that the object of the attitude is valuable for its own sake. This suggestion naturally prompts the reply that the analysis becomes circular. Certainly, this is true, but it is not a reason to reject the analysis. Cf. David Wiggins “A Sensible Subjectivism?,” essay 5 in his *Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 189. Not all circles are malignant. This one here belongs to the benign kind; the analysis is informative for anyone who knows what an evaluative *judgement* is. The circle would pose a serious threat where there is no other means to determine the judgement “*O* is valuable for its own sake” than by resorting to an analysis of (final) value. However, this is not the case. There are different ways to determine what *judgement* a person endorses. The point is that we do have independent means to determine *judgements* without having to recur to analyses of the notions that these judgements contain. If this is true about final favouring, I see no reason why it would not also apply to “favouring an object for some person’s sake”. Here the judgement will be slightly different. Let “valuable_x” refer to value-for *x*, i.e., what is of personal value for *x*. The judgement involved would then be something of the following sort: “*O* is valuable_x for its own sake”. For an illuminating work on different kinds of circles, see I. L. Humberstone, “Two Types of Circles,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57 (1997), pp. 249–280. I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for making me aware of it.

²⁹ The distinction between formal and substantive axiology is not clear-cut. For instance, how do we decide what is the “stuff” which should be analysed by the formal value theorist? Have we not, in fact, by singling out certain, say, judgements (as being evaluative ones) already taken an evaluative stand? But even if this might be true it does not follow that we cannot in an intelligible way still go on applying the notions ‘formal/substantive’ within this special framework. To argue that the distinction lacks applicability is to make a much too encompassing claim – one that appears to me to be questionable. I venture that on most occasions it is not very hard to separate the formal parts from the substantive issues.

These three alternatives are plausible examples of bearers of a value that we may suitably refer to as *welfare bearers*. Naturally, to say something of interest about welfare we need to say something in detail about these alternatives. But here I am not taking stand on whether welfare is applicable to only one or a combination of these (or some other) alternatives. That one large group of such agent-relative “welfare” values in fact composes the set of personal values seems intuitively plausible. It is at least very likely that the sort of supervenience base to which we normally ascribe welfare value, is such that they supply (or at least are considered to supply us with) reason for favouring them for the person’s sake.

Personal values, I shall say, consist of two fundamental categories of values, one of which holds those values-for the realization of which are welfare enhancing or preserving values (i.e., that enhances or preserves the kind of bearers of what is typically regarded as carrying welfare). The second category contains a related but nonetheless different kind of value-for. Objects carrying these other kinds of values are what we ought to favour for *a*’s sake without it being necessarily the case that this somehow contributes to *a*’s welfare, even if welfare here is understood in quite a broad enough sense. In other words, ‘sake’ here does not mean ‘person-welfare-sake’. Despite the fact that favouring *O* would not have any welfare-contributing properties, values belonging to this category would nonetheless exemplify something that is good for *a*. But, it might be objected, is that really possible? Can we actually favour something for *a*’s sake that is not welfare-promoting in some sense? A moment of reflection should show that it is in fact quite plausible.³⁰

Consider the attitude ‘respect’. Showing a person respect is not something one does, at least not necessarily, in order to contribute to this person’s welfare. Respecting someone might even in some cases have welfare-impairing effects. Respect has rather to do with what the person *is* or *represents*, and not with what you hope to achieve for the sake of this person’s welfare. For instance, once upon a time it was not uncommon that soldiers expressed respect for their enemies. This didn’t prevent them from wishing that the welfare of their enemies should come to an abrupt and most definitive end. Of course, many of these attitudes are obviously “old-fashioned”, and some are quite ridiculous. But this fact doesn’t change the

³⁰ But might one not insist that favouring something for someone’s sake always has to be understood in terms of what makes the person better off or what is in the person’s interest? Perhaps. The question is, of course, whether ‘better off’ or ‘interest’ here is supposed to refer to an impersonal value or to a personal one? In case it is, it would probably be to strain the word ‘better off’ a bit too much to say that everything which we have a reason to favour for a person’s sake will make him better off. See here also the paragraph on the ambiguity of good-for on p. 18.

picture that we conceptually can do things for someone's sake that do not necessarily mean doing them for the person's welfare. "Doing it for *a*'s sake" must, however, in some minimal sense be counted as being in favour of *a* – in the sense that being respected is regarded as positive, while being ignored or disrespected counts against a person.³¹

Respect belongs to a group of attitudes that presents the starkest counter-examples to the idea that doing something for someone's sake is necessarily doing it to preserve or promote someone's welfare. Other examples are: to admire, honour, esteem, like, and even to desire that something is the case. Even a response like desire, which traditionally is intimately associated with welfare, need not always be understood as welfare-regarding. For instance, a person may live an immoral (or inauthentic or irrational, etc.) life, and we might well desire that some states of affairs should obtain that would make his life moral (or authentic, etc.) despite the negative impact it would have on his welfare. We would still be favouring it for this person's sake.³²

We still lack a good understanding of what the 'for *x*'s sake' idiom comes to.³³ Notwithstanding, I venture to say that the above pieces of reasoning lend intuitive support to the idea that there is conceptual space to be filled for such complex constructions as '*O* ought to be favoured for *a*'s sake'.

We can next try our hands at an FA-style of analysis of personal value (henceforth, FAP):

(FAP): *O* has personal value for *x*, if and only if there is reason to favour *O* for *x*'s sake.

Thus, the kind of attitude that is called for, according to the FAP advocate, when some *O* carries a *personal value for x*, is that of *favouring O for x's sake*.

³¹ It might be argued that we are not in fact at all respecting *a* for *a*'s sake. We are rather respecting him for his dignity's sake; see for instance Stephen Darwall, *Welfare and Rational Care* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Now, it is quite inoffensive to say that we respect *a* for his dignity's (or courage's) sake, as long as this is not taken to imply that the proper object of our attitude is dignity or courage. Surely, what we respect is persons and not properties. It would be odd to argue the latter. See here Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value," p. 399.

³² Here is another example. A person whom I once knew well lived a very self-destructive life. Some years ago we lost contact, and when I recently learned that the person had passed away very much due to living a tragic life, I immediately felt sadness. However, I also realized that my mourning this person's death had a different character than what I experienced when, for instance, my father died. In the latter case, I was sad for my own sake at having lost someone I cared a lot about. In the former case, I cannot sincerely say that I cared much for this person. My sadness was rather of the following kind: I was sad for her sake. Her disastrous life called forth a special feeling, sadness, which I experienced for her sake.

³³ As was pointed out by the referees.

FAP captures a central sense of value-for. However, I cannot eliminate the possibility that ‘value for’ is ambiguous. For instance, a referee suggested that there is a sense of good-for that is different from the one FAP tries to reveal. When some *O* is conducive to a person *a*’s welfare it seems quite natural to say that *O* is good for *a*. There seems indeed to be a perfectly legitimate sense of ‘good for’ such that (i) something is good for a person *a* if and only if it increases or contributes to *a*’s welfare.³⁴ Of course, it might quite rightly be said that since ‘welfare’ in (i) refers to of an unspecified kind of value, it might be the sort of value that will eventually require an analysis like FAP. However, intuitively I think the referee is right, and that I should recognize that there is this sense of good-for.

The FAP approach to personal value is in several ways superior to DEFA for the reasons mentioned earlier. It has, I venture, a strong intuitive appeal, *qua* analysis of personal and not merely relative value. The object *O* not only has a value relative to some person. The object ought to be favoured in a special way; it should be favoured for some *person*’s sake. Doing something for someone’s sake is doing it with an eye to this particular person. A value understood in these terms is more appropriately described as a personal rather than impersonal value.

Like any FA analysis, FAP does not assume the truth or falsity of value subjectivism or value objectivism; the deontic statement in the analysis might well be given a subjectivist or an objectivist analysis. FAP is quite open on this matter. Nor does FAP limit personal value to extrinsic value; that we ought to favour *O* for *a*’s sake may depend on the internal as well as the external properties of *O*. Another advantage of FAP is that it does not necessarily make personal value conditional on some *de facto* favouring. An object of personal value is one that we ought to favour for a person’s sake, and this might well be the case whether or not anyone actually favours the object for this person’s sake. This point is less counterintuitive than it may appear to be. Suppose *a* did not know what her parents looked like; *a* knew them only by name. Furthermore, assume that there existed a photo of her parents, unknown to her. Such a photo could plausibly be said to carry a personal value for her whether or not she knew about it. The point is not, however, that the value of the photo would be only hypothetical, say, conditional on her cherishing the photo.

³⁴ A third notion seems also intimately related to welfare and good-for, namely ‘better off’. Thus, we might say that something is good-for a person if and only if it makes him better off and something makes a person better off if and only if it increases his welfare.

Nothing of relevance changes by adding that the attitudes are hypothetical. Whether or not the photo has personal value is, on the analysis outlined here, a question of whether we *ought* to favour the photo for *a*'s sake, and the truth or validity of this normative statement is not dependent on the truth of a hypothetical statement. However, suppose *a* declared, once we had drawn her attention to the photo, that she couldn't care less. Suppose further that it was actually true – and there is no reason to deny this possibility – *a* is absolutely indifferent to this photo. Does it follow that the photo then has no value – personal or some other kind of value? It might of course follow if we adhere to some kind of metavalue theory, according to which, say, values are constituted by attitudes (e.g. classical subjectivism, or more sophisticated non-cognitivism). But theories apart: Does it follow that the photo has no value – if *a* is indifferent to it? I don't think so!³⁵

6. Some problems

As a fitting-attitude analysis, FAP faces various problems. Moreover, it does seem to run into a couple of obstacles all by itself. This is not the place to discuss any of the objections in any greater detail. I will confine myself here to some comments on certain issues that concern FAP in particular.

First, FAP is formulated in terms of a reason that ranges over all agents. One might object to this on the following grounds. In contrast to other kinds of value, personal value is first and foremost someone's value, and so we need an argument to the effect that it is also, in a sense, everyone's value.

Admittedly, there is something to this idea. But not more than what can be accounted for by an FAP advocate. After all, this analysis does index a subject, and does in that sense “personalize” the value – even if it does so in an impersonal way (the reasons involved apply to us all).

There is a related possibility to be found in the drawers of the FAP analysis, or so it seems at least. A personal value might have more than one side – one facing the person for whom the value is “personal”, say, *a*, and another for all the rest of us. This might show itself in two ways: the attitude that it is fitting to take regarding the object may vary depending on whether it is, say (to continue with an earlier example), your daughter's drawing or not; it may also vary with regard to the strength of the reason. Some reasons appear to have a stronger norma-

³⁵ Of course, this is a substantial question (which it would be a pity to rule out on formal grounds), the answer to which requires some substantial reasoning – something there is no room for here.

tive force than other ones, and it is perhaps conceivable that one and the same object is Janus-like also with regard to this matter. But to what extent personal values are in fact in this or the former sense *Janus-values* is something that needs to be further examined. Despite the fact that the idea seems intellectually inspiring, I have not managed to come up with any convincing cases. My suspicion is therefore that if personal values do have this “double-sidedness”, there are not many of the kind. Further examination into this matter might well prove me wrong.

Second, FAP might fail to account for everything we consider to be of personal value. Think of a teenager, *a*, who values a band because it appeals only to her, and would stop valuing them if she realized that her parents favoured the band.³⁶ Given the example, an object *O* has personal value for *a*, only if *a* thinks that certain others *don't* have a reason to favour *O*.

Teenagers' attitudes do sometimes seem to be conditional in this way. This case is, however, not an obvious counter-example to FAP. The “teenager argument” tries first to establish on intuitive grounds that an object of such a particular conditional attitude may carry personal value. Second, it suggests that if FAP were applied to the case it would imply that the parents (among others) have a reason to favour the band, and this would run counter to one of the value-making properties of the band, namely that parents (and some other) do not have a reason to favour the band.

There is really no space to elaborate on either step here. But let me at least indicate why the example does not strike me as a plausible bearer of personal value. The nature of *a*'s attitude is obviously conditional, which strongly suggests that there is something besides the band that the teenager values more than the band. It might be that she desires to be a certain kind of person – one who doesn't share some of the properties of her parents. Being a certain kind of person is a plausible bearer of a personal value, and one which FAP may easily account for. But suppose I am wrong, and that the band in fact would have personal, albeit conditional, value for *a* (and I mean by this not merely that it is *de facto* favoured by *a*); the band would carry a conditional personal value. This does not in itself show that FAP is jeopardized. First, whether the parents have a reason to favour the band for *a*'s sake or not is not obviously settled by the fact that the band is favoured by *a* on condition that the *parents do not think* that they have a reason to favour the band. The one doesn't exclude the other. Moreover, suppose that *a*'s favouring is of the following sort: *a* desires to listen to the band at a very high vol-

³⁶ I owe this example to Michael Brady (personal communication).

ume, on condition that the parents do not desire (or consider themselves as having a reason to desire) the same. Again, this is not itself a reason to rule out that the parents might have a reason to favour that the states of affairs that *a* wants to obtain should obtain for *a*'s sake. This is quite consistent with the fact that they do not have to desire to listen to the band.

It is important³⁷ to underline that FAP is formulated in terms of reasons that have an “objective” reading in the following sense: what reasons there are to favour an object is not thought to be dependent on our beliefs. We may not know what features of an object are reason-providing, but they are notwithstanding reason-providing.

Perhaps not all examples can be dealt with in this fashion. But acknowledging that FAP *may* run into troubles regarding these special conditional personal values does not lay FAP on the line – at least not in any serious way. At most, it shows that it might not apply to a special case of conditional personal value.

Third, we do not confine ourselves to speaking about the welfare of people we care about. We also express judgements about the welfare of people that we are indifferent to, or that we even dislike. For example, although we dislike Hitler, many people are nevertheless inclined to say that Eva Braun was good for Hitler. FAP appears to have counter-intuitive results here. Why ought we to favour Braun for Hitler's sake?

There are, as I will outline in a moment, different ways for an FAP advocate to deal with this kind of objection. Meanwhile, I would like to comment briefly on Stephen Darwall's recent analysis of welfare, which seems to handle cases like the aforementioned one without any counter-intuitive results.³⁸

The central tenet of Darwall's “rational care theory of welfare” is the following:

a person's good is constituted [. . .] by what one (perhaps she) should want *insofar* as one cares about her. (p. 4)

The “care-proviso” is, of course, what stands out here. For Darwall it is a crucial element. It makes it possible, according to him, to account for the normative feature of welfare:

³⁷ As a referee rightly stressed.

³⁸ See Darwall, *Welfare and Rational Care*. I am obliged to an anonymous referee who pointed out the similarities between Darwall's analysis and my own. After having submitted the paper, I wrote a report on his book: “Recension av Stephen Darwalls *Welfare and Rational Care*,” *Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy*, 4.2 (2004), pp. 171–180.

To understand the normativity of welfare [. . .] we must see it in relation to care. [. . .] What is a conceptual truth is that to care for someone is to be in a relation to him such that considerations of that person's welfare are normative for one's desires and actions with respect to him. *What is for someone's good or welfare is what one ought to desire and promote insofar as one cares for him.* (pp. 6–7)

The normativity is not, however, the agent-relative kind of rational preference. It is rather an agent-neutral normativity grasped from the perspective of someone who cares for the person. (p. 45)³⁹

Darwall's approach seems promising to me. For instance, thinking that something is good for Hitler does not require that we have some actual attitude; it only requires that we believe that it is something that there is reason to want insofar as we care about Hitler. But it does also raise a number of questions. Here, I will confine myself to mainly one feature of it that I find problematic.⁴⁰

According to the analysis, a person x 's good accrues to an object O if and only if O is what we should want "insofar as one cares about" x . My own analysis resembles this claim. But there are also a couple of important differences. First, Darwall's analysandum appears to be much narrower. Second, this might account for the fact that he formulates his analysans in terms of only one sort of attitude, whereas FAP admits of a whole spectrum (perhaps even spectra) of different kinds of attitudes. Third, Darwall's analysans is not a straightforward fitting-analysis; it is formulated in terms of what we want *insofar* as we have some other attitude, viz., caring.

Why this condition? As we have seen, Darwall is quite explicit about it. Were it not for the fact that we cared about this person then there would be no way of saying what we would have reason to want for this person's sake. Thus, 'caring for' is a guarantee for the normativity of 'good-for'; unless we cared, we would not have a reason to want anything for a 's sake.

³⁹ Darwall assumes that care or sympathetic concern, as he also refers to it, "is something like a psychological natural kind".

⁴⁰ I have discussed these problems in "Recension av Stephen Darwalls *Welfare and Rational Care*". For instance, one concerns the fact the analysis seems to give us something more than an analysis, namely, a criterion to single out what is in fact beneficial to individuals. See for instance p. 31, where he says "Something is for someone's good if it is what that person would want for herself, as she actually is, insofar as she is fully knowledgeable and experienced *and* unreservedly concerned for herself". This is presented, given that "any informed-desire standard can serve" as a "plausible criterion of welfare". Moreover, this "criterion" does resemble his *analysis* of welfare quoted above. Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine the distinction between analysing x and suggesting a criterion for what counts as x . But in Darwall's case, by adding the "care-proviso" he does appear to be trying to ensure that the analysis will not lead us to call things good-for that do not make the person better. If this is the case, it should be avoided. A formal analysis ought not to contain parts that aim at securing "correct" substantive judgements.

Darwall's suggestion seems to reflect an underlying well-known view on practical reason. The details of Darwall's version of it, e.g., how encompassing it is, are not clear to me. However, a central idea seems to be that what we have reasons to do is all ultimately desire- (attitude-) based, or (as one referee suggested) if we focus on welfare, based on *certain* kinds of attitudes". Construing the analysis in terms of either of these two suggestions, would make it dependent on a particular way of understanding reasons that would be accepted only by defenders of this particular view on reasons. Now, whether or not attitude based views of either sort are plausible or not, and I am prone to think that they are not, it would be a considerable drawback to reserve the analysis to advocates of one particular theory about reasons. As far as I can see, an analysis of good-for is illuminating even if the deontic notion is regarded as a primitive. It is one thing to understand value (be it impersonal or personal) in terms of some deontic expression like 'ought', 'reason', etc. It is quite another thing to require that only insofar certain kinds of attitudes are present is something (say, a certain fact) supplying reason. Darwall's "insofar" proviso is in my view a superfluous element in his analysis of personal value, which, moreover, makes it less interesting to any but adherents of a special view on reasons. Thus, first we try to analyse value-for, and we come to believe that it must be understood along the lines of FAP, i.e., in terms of reasons, and then we may interpret what the reasons are. But that is not something to include in the notion of reason.⁴¹

7. More problems

Let us next return to the strategies that are open to an FAP adherent when confronted with objections like the Eva Braun case. As might be recalled, the objection was the following:

⁴¹ Accounting for the normativity in terms of what I have referred to as his "care-proviso" raises an interesting issue: should we regard welfare as normative when we need to formulate the analysis of it in terms of a condition? Or should we say that it has merely conditional normativity? This might be a mere terminological quibble, but I suspect it is not. Consider the distinction between "a belief on a condition" (e.g., that there is tiger in my living room, given that I see it with my own eyes), and a "conditional belief" (e.g., that *if* there is a tiger in my living room, then I will believe I am in danger) (I thank Wlodek Rabinowicz for reminding me of this analogy); whereas the former is not one that I have unless the condition is met, the latter is a belief – it is just not a categorical one. Now, it might be replied that this suggests that we should rather formulate the analysans in analogy with a conditional belief. Thus, in, say, the Eva Braun example we would get something like following lines: *If you care for Hitler, then you ought to favour Eva Braun (for Hitler's sake)*. However; as mentioned before, if we introduce the "attitude (care)-clause" in order to secure the normativity of the consequent, I would rule this out for the reasons mentioned in the main text. I side with those who think that reasons *must* be attitude-given. If this is not what is behind the "conditional form", then I suspect the disagreement between an FAP advocate and someone offering this kind of analysis may well boil down to a substantive disagreement about what reasons there are. I don't want to exclude that there are such "conditional values". But consenting to this is consistent with there being values in a stronger sense requiring a categorical analysans, which is what I try to deliver.

Most of us couldn't care less about what was done for Hitler's sake, but although this might be correct, it is still plausible to say that Braun had personal value for Hitler. It could therefore be argued that FAP, which (in contrast to Darwall's account) requires us to have attitudes versus Eva Braun for Hitler's sake, should be rejected because it is counter-intuitive.

There are in fact two quite familiar strategies open to an FAP advocate: one explains why these examples appear counter-intuitive in such a way that the analysis does not come out as requiring that we hold actual pro-responses with an eye to Hitler. On the second approach we are forced to swallow the bitter pill; if Braun has personal value for Hitler then we should have pro-responses vis-à-vis Braun for Hitler's sake.

Considering the first strategy, a combination of two well-known replies will be helpful: First, we must not forget that it is quite possible that Braun had no personal value for Hitler. But notice, to say this is not to deny that Hitler, *de facto*, did favour Braun. Apparently he did. But, again, from the fact that he loved, cherished, etc., Braun it does not follow that she was a carrier of personal value. It only means that she was the object of some of Hitler's pro-responses. But, it might be argued, this fact does not explain our intuition that we do seem ready to say, not merely that she was an object of his, say, liking, but that she had value for him. The explanation of why we seem to be ready to hold that Braun had value for Hitler is perhaps that we are so used to the idea of not paying attention to the metavalues issues that arise when we speak about personal values, the reason being that we take the following as obvious: *If someone cherishes, desires, etc., an object it has value for that person.* But although people often reason like this, it is no reason to say that it leads to a correct position. I don't see why personal value should be exempted from the standard issues that arise when we talk about (impersonal) value.

Of course, the reason we want to say that Braun carries value-for need not be that we are metaethically naïve. Perhaps the judgement "Braun is good for Hitler" expresses what R. M. Hare called an inverted-commas judgement. What we say is that Braun has value for Hitler, *according to* Hitler. In other words, the 'good-for' in the judgement is parasitic on the genuine evaluation of Hitler. Both replies seem plausible. It is their generality that worries me. Is it really always the case that we are either metaethically naïve or expressing some kind of inverted-commas judgement when we judge that something is good-for a person whom we dislike?

The second strategy acknowledges that the judgement "Braun is good-for Hitler" is a genuine evaluative judgement; it handles the counter-intuitiveness by underlining that the reasons

involved here are so-called pro-tanto reasons, i.e., reasons that persist even in the presence of outweighing counter-reasons. Thinking that Braun is good for Hitler is thinking that we pro-tanto ought to have some pro-response regarding Braun for Hitler's sake. Admitting this is, of course, not admitting that a person is all-things-considered worthy of our pro-responses.

Both approaches are in fact combinable, which *a fortiori* strengthens the FAP advocate in his defence of the idea that FAP just might account for people's personal values – whether or not they involve malicious people.

Still, patchwork solutions are rarely ideal, and it is a good idea to look for more plausible ways of dealing with these alleged counter-examples. One appealing approach suggested by a referee, deals with the Braun-Hitler case by distinguishing between moral and non moral reasons to favour Braun for Hitler's sake. The atrocities committed by Hitler are perhaps such that we have no moral reason to favour anything for his sake. However, this is consistent, or so it might seem, with there being non-moral reasons to favour Braun for his sake. Suggesting that the reasons to favour Braun for Hitler's sake would be non-moral has the obvious merit that it kills two troublesome birds with one stone: the counterintuitiveness of the patchwork explanation is gone – she has value for him. However, recognizing this does not necessarily commit us to favour her for his sake. Such commitment would follow if we were non-responsive to moral reasons or if moral reasons did not override other sorts of reason.

Just how passable a road this is remains to be showed. It faces, of course, quite a hindrance, namely to tell us what exactly makes a reason into a moral one, a task that I will not undertake here.⁴²

Fourth, FAP is likely to be regarded as too demanding. Consider the following example: Suppose winning the New York marathon has personal value to Charlie. Furthermore, assume that you want to win this race too. Is it really the case that you should then favour his victory for his sake? Isn't that just plain counterintuitive?⁴³

Before giving in to this objection we should investigate to what extent the judgement “*O* has personal value for *C*” is a genuine evaluation. I venture that much resistance to the norma-

⁴² Consider again the “pro-tanto” solution. It was argued that Braun being good for Hitler supplies us with a pro -tanto reason to have some pro-response regarding Braun for Hitler's sake, but that it does not follow from this that Hitler is *pro-toto* worthy of our pro-responses. The referee's suggestion might in fact strengthen this claim given the following premise; in the case a moral reason is a pro-tanto reason and it is in conflict with another non-moral pro-tanto reason, the latter is overridden by the former.

⁴³ The examples are inspired by objections made to me by Jonas Olson and Michael Brady.

tivity of personal value thrives on not realizing that the examples concern inverted-commas uses of ‘value-for’, or because it is assumed that “*O* has personal value for *C*” is equivalent to “*O* is de facto favoured by *C*”. Still, suppose someone claims that he recognizes that *O* has personal value for *C*, but who denies that this gives him any reason to favour *O* for *C*’s sake. Pointing out that reasons here might mean ‘pro-tanto reasons’ will hopefully clear away more of the misunderstanding. But what should we say to someone who continued denying that there was any reason at all to favour *O* for *C*’s sake? We could try reminding him that “favouring” is a technical term that covers a wide spectrum of attitudes. In other words, there is a variety of “favourings” that might be relevant here, such as to be glad for *C*’s sake or to respect the medal for *C*’s sake (and not, say, spit on it). Many more examples could be given. Of course, some persons might insist that absolutely nothing whatsoever follows regarding our attitudinal stance to *O*, from *O* being of personal value to *C*.⁴⁴ But now we have arrived at a point where at least I find it hard to understand what ‘value’ in ‘value-for’ stands for in this person’s view.

⁴⁴ An alternative approach to this issue would be to ask the persisting person the following question: Wouldn’t you at least accept that if you want to do everything that can be done for *x*’s sake, you ought to favour *O*? I owe this informal suggestion (personal communication) to Margaret Gilbert. Cf. also Stephen Darwall’s *Welfare and Rational Care*. An anonymous reviewer also expressed a similar point. These suggestions are worth considering. However, whereas these proposals regard (personal) value as normatively conditional on a person’s attitudes (wants and cares for...), my suggestion sets out from the idea that what we have reasons to do is not necessarily a matter of what attitudes we have.