

## Wlodek Rabinowicz – short cv

Born in Warsaw, on January 14, 1947. Married to Ewa Rabinowicz, two daughters, Julia Hertzman and Noomi Egan. Five grandchildren.

**Current professional status:** Professor emeritus of practical philosophy, Lund university.

**Career:** Studied philosophy at the University of Warsaw starting 1964; expelled from the university in the aftermath of the student rebellion (March 1968); moved to Sweden 1969. After receiving a doctorate in practical philosophy from Uppsala University in September 1979 and that same year the title of a docent, stayed on in Uppsala as associate professor. Was acting chair of practical philosophy 1987-89, head of the Uppsala philosophy department 1988-93, and a director of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS) in Uppsala 1994-5. Appointed to the chair of practical philosophy at Lund University in 1995. Retired from that position in 2014. Since then, has continually held post-retirement part-time positions in Lund, as senior professor and researcher.

Supervised more than fifteen doctoral students, and pursued research in normative ethics, meta-ethics, value theory, decision theory, and formal epistemology.

**Research projects and grants:** Led large research projects on dynamic decision making (2001 – 2004) and on philosophical theories of value (2003 – 2007), both financed by the Tercentenary Fund of the Bank of Sweden. Had a long-term personal grant for research in value theory from the Swedish Research Council (2007 – 2012).

Currently participates in Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project (LGRP) and the project on Climate Ethics and Future Generations (at Institute of Future's Studies, Stockholm).

**Current fields of research:** value theory (value analysis, formal axiology, incommensurability), normative ethics (consequentialism, population ethics) and decision theory (sequential choice).

Total number of publications: more than 170.

**Evaluation assignments (selection):** a member of expert panels of the Tercentenary Fund of the Bank of Sweden (2003 – 2006), Academy of Finland (2008, 2010 – 2012, 2012 – chair), Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study (2005 – 2019), European Science Foundation and European Research Council (2015, 2017).

A member, and for five years the chair, of the committee for the Rolf Schock prize in

logic and philosophy awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2004 – 2022, chair: 2009 - 2014).

**Visiting positions:** the Leibniz Professor in Leipzig in 200, an adjunct professorship at the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS), Australian National University, Canberra (2003–07), visiting fellowships at All Souls College in Oxford, in 2007, and at the University College, also in Oxford, in 2013. A non-resident long-term fellow of Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study 2005 – 2019.

**Honorary professorships:** a Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics (2013 – 2016), an Honorary Professor at the University of York (2016 – 2020) and at the Australian National University, Canberra (2017 – 2020).

**Editorships:** *Theoria* (1995 – up to present, editor-in-chief 1997 – 1999), *Economics and Philosophy* (1997 – 2002), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2013 – 2016).

**Editorial boards:** currently, a member of more than a dozen editorial boards for philosophy journals such as *Ethics*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, etc.

**Positions of trust (selection):** President of the European Society of Analytic Philosophy (1999 – 2002); the secretary and then the chairman of the Swedish Philosophical Society (1995 – 1997, 2007 – 2009).

**Member of academies and learned societies:** Institut International de Philosophie, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Academia Europaea, British Academy (corresponding fellow). Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences in Uppsala (corresponding member), Scientific Society in Lund, Royal Society of Letters in Lund.

## Publications

1. *Universalizability. A study in morals and metaphysics*, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publ. Comp. 1979, 190 pages.
2. "Utilitarianism and conflicting obligations", *Theoria* 44, 1978, 19-24.
3. "An alleged new refutation of St.Anzelm's argument", *Ratio* 20, 1978, 149-150.
4. "Reasonable beliefs", *Theory and Decision* 10, 1979, 61-81.

5. "Some remarks on the family K of modal systems", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 21, 1980, 429-47.
6. "Donald Davidson i Uppsala", with Jan Österberg, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1981, 34-39.
7. "Är inre egenskaper och relationer osägbara?" ("Are internal properties and relations inexpressible?"), *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 2/1981, 29-35.
8. *Tankar och Tankefel tillägnade Zalma Puterman* (Festschrift), editor, Uppsala: Philosophical Studies no. 33, 1981, 224 pages.
9. "Two causal decision theories: Lewis vs Sobel", in Tom Pauli (ed.), *Philosophical Essays dedicated to Lennart Åqvist*, Uppsala: Philosophical Studies no. 34, 1982, 299-321.
10. "Ratificationism without ratification: Jeffrey meets Savage", *Theory and Decision* 19, 1985, 171-200.
11. "Om ratifikationismen. Kritik av Jeffrey's nya 'beslutslogik'" ("On ratificationism. A critique of Jeffrey's new 'logic of decision'"), *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1985, 16-33.
12. "The universalizability dilemma", in Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons (eds.), *Morality and Universality. Essays on ethical universalizability*, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publ. Comp. 1985, 75-90;  
A Japanese translation of this paper was published in *The Seinan Law Review*, Seinan Gaukuin University, Fukuoka, Japan, 1994.
13. "Intuitionistic truth", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 14, 1985, 191-228.
14. "Non-cooperative games for expected utility maximizers", in Paul Needham och Jan Odelstad (eds.), *Changing Positions. Essays dedicated to Lars Lindahl*, Uppsala: Philosophical Studies no 38, 1986, 215-233.
15. "Kripke i Uppsala", with Sten Lindström, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 3/1986, 35-40.
16. "Föllesdal i Uppsala", with Sten Lindström, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1987, 31-43.
17. "Ratifiability and stability", in Peter Gärdenfors och Nils-Eric Sahlin (eds.), *Decision, Probability, and Utility*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1988, 406-425.
18. "Stable and retrievable options", *Philosophy of Science* 56, 1989, 624-641.
19. "On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision", with Sten Lindström, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 18, 1989, 69-101.
20. *In So Many Words. Essays dedicated to Sven Danielsson*, edited with Sten Lindström, Uppsala: Philosophica Studies no 42, 1989, 405 pages.
21. "Condorcet's voting paradox and the modified majority rule", *ibid.*, 1989, 155-175.
22. "Act-utilitarian prisoner-dilemmas", *Theoria* 55, 1989, 1-44.
23. "Kaplan i Uppsala", with Sten Lindström, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1988, 24-41.
24. "Hare on Prudence", *Theoria* 55, 1989, 145-51.
25. "Rationella beslut under osäkerhet eller hur man skall handla i blindo" ("Rational decisions under uncertainty or how to act in the dark"), *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1990, 1-12.
26. *Valets vedermödor. Sex beslutsteoretiska studier (The Agony of Choice. Six studies in theory of decision)*, editor, Stockholm: Thales 1991, 120 pages.

- 27."Spelteori för hyperrationella spelare" ("Game theory for hyperrational players"), *ibid.*, 1991, 48-59.
- 28."Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision", with Sten Lindström, in A. Fuhrmann och M. Morreau (eds.), *The Logic of Theory Change*, Berlin: Springer 1991, 93-126.
- 29."The Negative Ramsey Test: Another Triviality Result", with Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström and Michael Morreau, *ibid.*, 1991, 129-34.
- 30."Epistemic Conditionals and Belief Revision", *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis*, vol.28 (1989-1990), Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International 1991, 97-112.
- 31."Tortuous labyrinth. Non-cooperative normal form games among hyperrational players", in Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), *Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992, 107-25.
- 32."Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals, and the Ramsey Test", with Sten Lindström, *Synthese* 91, 1992, 195-237.
- 33."Cooperating with cooperators - notes on Jan Österberg's Collective Egoism", *Erkenntnis* 38, 1993, 23-55.
- 34."Ett fängslade problem. Fångens dilemma, oväntade tentor och flera fräcka fripassagerare" ("A Captivating Problem. Prisoner's Dilemma, Unexpected Examinations and Several Cheeky Free-Riders"), in Åke E. Andersson and Nils-Erik Sahlin (eds.), *Huvudinnehåll. Tolv filosofiska uppsatser*, Nora: Nya Doxa 1993, 157-172.
- 35."De gröna smaragdernas gåta" ("The Riddle of Green Emeralds"), *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 1993.
- 36."Folke Tersmans *Reflective Equilibrium - An Essay in Moral Epistemology*", extended critical review, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 3/1994, 37-60.
37. "Actual Truth and Its Possible Knowledge", with Krister Segerberg, in Ronald Fagin (ed.), *Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference (TARK 1994)*, San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers 1994, 122-137.
38. "Actual Truth, Possible Knowledge", with Krister Segerberg, *Topoi* 13, 1994, 101-115; an expanded version of (37).
- 39."How to Model Belief Revision", with Sten Lindström, in Dag Prawitz and Dag Westerståhl (eds.), *Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Papers from the 9<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994, 69-84.
40. "The Ramsey Test Revisited", with Sten Lindström, *Theoria* 58, 1992, 131-182; revised version in Gabriela Crocco, Luis Farinas del Cerro and Andreas Herzig, *Conditionals in AI*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995, 147-192.
41. "To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choices and Expected-Utility Violations", *The Journal of Philosophy* 92, 1995, 586-620.
42. *Logic for a Change*, Festschrift for Sten Lindström, edited with Sven Ove Hansson, *Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy* 1995, 173 pages.
43. "Global Belief Revision Based on Similarities between Worlds", *ibid.*, 1995, 80-105.

44. "Allais' problem och Malmnäs' ", with Jan Odelstad, *Filosofisk Tidskrift*, 3/1995, 3-9.
45. "Om Seidenfelds kritik av sofistikerade brott mot oberoendeaxiomet", *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 4/1995.
46. "Stable Revision, or Is Preservation Worth Preserving?", in André Fuhrmann and Hans Rott (eds.), *Logic, Action and Information*, Berlin - New York: Walter de Gruyter 1996, 101-128.
47. "Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism", with Jan Österberg, *Economics and Philosophy* 12, 1996, 1-27; also in (49), 205-233.
48. "Värde grundat på preferens: Om två tolkningar av preferensutilitarism", *Filosofisk Tidsskrift* 4/1996, 21-36, a summary of (47).
49. *Preference and Value - Preferentialism in Ethics* (editor), Lund: Studies in Philosophy 1996, 233 pages.
50. "Presumption of equality or ethica more geometrico demonstrata", *Lund Philosophy Reports* 1996, 1-59.
51. "What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism", with Bertil Strömberg, *Theoria* 62, 1996, 95-123; also in (49), 176-204.
52. "Värde och Preferens. Preferensutilitarism i ny skepnad" ("Value and Preference. Preference Utilitarianism in a New Guise"), in *Lundaforskare föreläser, årg. 28*, Lund: Lund University Press 1996, 17-23.
53. "Wise Choice: On Dynamic Decision-Making without Independence", in Eva Ejerhed and Sten Lindström (eds), *Logic, Action, and Cognition*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997, 97-112.
54. "On Seidenfeld's Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom", *Theory and Decision* 43, 1997, 279-292.
55. "Att resonera baklänges" ("Reasoning Backwards"), *Tidskrift för politisk filosofi* 1, 1997, 38-56.
56. "Om tal och tystnad i spelteori" ("On Speech and Silence in Game Theory"), in Hans Andersson och Eva Östeberg (eds.), *Tystnader*, Lund: Lund University Press 1997, 65-73.
57. "Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accomodating Iterated Beliefs and Ramsey Conditionals within DDL", with Sten Lindström, in L. Lindahl, P. Needham, R.Sliwinski (eds.), *For Good Measure*, Uppsala: Philosophical Studies 46, 1997, 126-153.
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60. "The Evidentiary Value Model", with Nils-Eric Sahlin, in Dov Gabbay and Philippe Smets (eds.), *Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Mangement Systems*, vol. 1 (*Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Precision*), Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998, 247-265.

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62. "Grappling with the Centipede - Defence of Backward Induction in BI-terminating Games", *Economics and Philosophy* 14, 1998, 95-126.
63. "Peczenik's Passionate Reason", in Aulis Arnio, Robert Alexy, Aleksander Peczenik, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Jan Wolenski, *On Coherence Theory of Law*, Studies published by the Faculty of Law in Lund 131, Acta Societatis Juridicae Lundensis, Lund: Jurisförlaget 1998, 17-23.
64. "Preference Logic and Radical Interpretation: Kanger meets Davidson", in Lars Lindahl, Jan Odelstad, Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), *Not Without Cause - Philosophical Essays dedicated to Paul Needham*, Uppsala: Philosophical Studies 48, 1998, 170-191. Revised versions in Ghita Holmström Hintikka, Sten Lindström and Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), *Collected Papers on Stig Kanger with Essays on His Life and Work*, vol. 2, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001, 221-42, and in P. Gärdenfors, J. Wolenski and K. Kijania-Placek, *In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, vol. 1, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, 213-34.
65. "Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game", with John Broome, *Analysis* 59, 1999, 237-242.
66. "Alchourrona, Gärdenforsa i Makinsona teoria systemów przekonań" (in Polish, presentation of the AGM-program in belief revision), encyclopedic note to Ryszard Wojcicki, *Ajdukiewicz. Teoria Znaczenia* [Ajdukiewicz. Meaning Theory], Filozofia Polska XX wieku, vol. 1, Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka 1999, 49-52.
67. "DDL Unlimited - Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents", with Sten Lindström, *Erkenntnis* 50, 1999, 353-385.
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69. "Backward Induction in a Small Class of Games from Two Perspectives on Rational Choice", in Timothy Childers (ed.), *The Logica Yearbook 1998*, Prague 1999, 142-156.
70. *Spinning Ideas – An Electronic Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors*, edited with Bengt Hansson, Sören Halldén and Nils-Eric Sahlin, 1999, online, <http://www.lu.se/spinning/>
71. "Belief Change for Introspective Agents", with Sten Lindström, 1999, in (70).
72. "Finala och intrinsikala värden" ("Final and Intrinsic Values"), with Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 3/1999, 20-33.
73. "Kotarbinski's Early Criticism of Utilitarianism" (a translation from Polish of Tadeusz Kotarbinski's "Utilitarianism and The Ethics of Pity", with an introduction), in Danielsson, Segerberg, Sliwinski (eds.): *Philosophical Crumbs, Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Ann-Marie Henschen-Dahlquist on the occasion of her seventy-fifth birthday*, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 49, Uppsala 1999, 177-182. Also published in *Utilitas* 12, 2000, 79-84.
74. "Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Reply to Seidenfeld", *Theory and Decision* 48, 2000, 311-318.

75. 'Prioritarianism and Uncertainty: On the Interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View', in D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), *Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001, 139-165.
76. "Money Pump with Foresight", in Michael J. Almeida (ed.), *Imperceptible Harms and Benefits*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2000, 123-154. Also in (80), 2000, 201-234.
77. "Backward Induction in Games: An Attempt at Logical Reconstruction", in (80), 2000, 243-256.
78. "Re-considering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas", with Magnus Jiborn, in (80), 2000, pp. 121-40; a revised version in *Synthese* 136, 2003, 135-57.
79. "A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers", in (80), 2000, 235-42; a revised version in *Studia Logica* 67, 2001, 167-178.
80. *Value and Choice – Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy*, editor, Lund Philosophy Reports 2000:1, 256 pages.
81. "Interpreting Preferences", revised version of (64), in Timothy Childers (ed.), *The Logica Yearbook 1999*, Prague 2000, 118-139.
82. "The Size of Inequality and Its Badness – Some Reflections around Temkin's *Inequality*", *Theoria* 69, 2003, 60-84.
83. "The Jury Theorem and the Discursive Dilemma", with Philip Pettit, included as a n appendix in Pettit's "Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma", *Philosophical Issues* (supplement till *Nous*) 11, 2001, pp. 268-99.
84. "Tropic of Value", with Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, in Erik Carlson och Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), *Omnium-gatherum. Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Jan Österberg*, Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2001, 263-277; a revised version in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66, 2003, 389-403. Re-printed in T. Rønnow-Rasmussen and M. Zimmerman (eds), *Recent Work on Intrinsic Value*, Dordrecht: Springer 2005, 213-28.
85. "Värdefulla ting" ("Valuable things"), with Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, *Filosofisk Tidskrift* 1/2001, 48-59.
86. "Demokratisk argumentation: Om juryteoremets tillämpning på komplexa kollektiva beslut" (Democratic Argumentation: On the Application of the Jury Theorem to Complex Collective Decisions), with Luc Bovens, *Tidskrift för politisk filosofi* 1/2001, 14-37.
87. *Value and Choice – Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy*, vol. 2, editor, Lund Philosophy Reports 2001:1, 207 pages.
88. "Does Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?", in (87), 2001, 163-192.
89. "Remarks on the Absentminded Driver", in (87), 2001, pp. 192-207. A revised version in *Studia Logica* 73, 2003, 241-56.
90. "Backward Induction Without Full Trust in Rationality", with Magnus Jiborn, in (87), 2001, 101-120.
91. "Prioritarianism for Prospects", *Utilitas* 14, 2002, 2-21.
92. "Demokrati och komplexa beslut – omigen" [Democracy and Complex Decisions – Again], with Luc Bovens, *Tidskrift för politisk filosofi* 3/2002, 52-6.

93. "Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – An Epistemic Perspective", with Luc Bovens, *Synthese* 150 (2006), pp. 131-53.
94. "Democracy and Argument – Tracking Truth in Complex Social Decisions", with Luc Bovens, in Anne van Aaken, Christian List, Christoph Lütge (eds), *Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory, and Deliberative Democracy*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, 143-57.
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99. *Patterns of Value – Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis*, vol. 1, edited with Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund Philosophy Reports 2003:1, 282 pages.
101. "On Millian Discontinuities", with Gustaf Arrhenius, in (99), 1-8.
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106. "Mechanisms of Truth-Directedness – Comments on Pascal Engel's 'Truth and the Aim of Belief'", in Donald Gillies (ed.), *Laws and Models in Science*, London: King's College Publications 2005, 101-6.
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