The Department of Philosophy is delighted to welcome professor Katie Steele (ANU) to the Higher seminar in practical philosophy. She will give a self-contained presentation of a joint work with Shang Long Yeo NUS) entitled

 Psychological Choice Theory and Moral Reasoning

Some claim that the choice judgments or ‘intuitions’ taken to support a moral distinction between ‘doing (harm)’ and ‘allowing (harm)’ can be explained by the general psychological choice theory known as Prospect Theory (see, especially, Horowitz 1998). Others disagree. All seem to accept that there is much at stake: if Prospect Theory can explain the choice intuitions, that would undermine their moral significance (i.e., their role in confirming the proposed moral distinction or principle). In this paper, we argue that the debate is muddied by confusion and can be fruitfully reframed. For starters, Prospect Theory can itself be understood in a purely formal or rather a more substantive fashion. Either way, if the theory explains the target choice intuitions, that would not in itself impugn their moral significance and may even facilitate better understanding of their nature and dynamics. The moral significance of the target choice intuitions turns rather on how they and other ‘non-moral’ choice judgments or intuitions are jointly explained. This, we claim, is the key insight of Tamara Horowitz’s (1998) provocative paper, and it has wide implications for whether and when choice intuitions provide support for moral principles.

The seminar begins as usual at 13.15!!

Anders Herlitz will be chairing this event.