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Presentation  På svenska, tack »
I have a PhD in Theoretical Philosophy, an MSc in Applied Computer Science and a BA in Mathematics form the University of Uppsala, Sweden. I became a Docent in Uppsala 2001. Between 1997-2003 I was a research fellow at the University of Constance, Germany, where I became a docent (Privatdozent) in 2003 after having presented a second dissertation (Habilitationsschrift) entitled Coherence and Truth of Testimony, which summarizes, systematizes and extends the research I have conducted on epistemological coherence since year 2001. The book has been published by Oxford University Press, under the new title Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. A new paperback edition is scheduled for 2008. During 2003-2007, I was assistent professor in Lund, financed by the Swedish Research Council. Since March 1 2007, I am full professor and Chair in Theoretical Philosophy. My main areas of research are epistemology and philosophy of science, but I have also published on metaphilosophy, metaphysics, philosophical logic and the history of logic. See my CV for a full list of publications and other details.
Doctoral students
Sebastian Enqvist (writes on the dynamics of knowledge)
Stefan Schubert (writes on coherence and probability)
Reviews of Against Coherence
- "The book is a must-read for anyone interested in contemporary (and historical) work on coherence theories of memory, belief and testimony. As a whole the book presents a very nice example of formal epistemology at its best."
Horacio Arlo-Costa, Theoria, vol. LXXIII, part 1, 2007: 87-93.
- "Erik Olsson’s book is a fascinating contribution to the literature on formal models of coherence and will be essential reading for anyone wishing to keep abreast of that literature."
Charles B. Cross, Mind, vol. 115, 2006: 790-793.
- "Anyone interested in the coherence theory or in probabilistic approaches to epistemology needs to attend closely to Olsson's careful and extremely important work."
Michael Huemer, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, the review can be found here.
- "What distinquishes Olsson's work is careful and sympathetic interpretations of leading coherentists' claims and their formal repudiation couched in the probability calculus."
Tomoji Shogenji, to appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Stephen Hetherington, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 84 (3), 2006: 461-463.
- Nicola Mößner, to appear in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung (in German).
- Nicla Vassallo, Epistemologia: Revista Italiana di Filosofia della Scienza, vol. 29, 2006: 584-585 (in Italian).
- Erich P. Schellhammer, The Review of Metaphysics 61(2), 2007.
Review of Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi
- "This book treats important topics in epistemology and metaphysics, and its essays uniformly reach a high level of scholarship. Theorists in philosophy, computer science, and psychology will profit from reading it thoroughly." Paul Weirich, Notre Dame Philosophical Review
Current research
- Coherence and truth
- Reliabilism, in particular the value of knowledge and the so-called generality problem
- The role of the research agenda in scientific change
- The epistemology of social networks
Projects and organization
- Organizer of the Swedish National Congress in Philosophy (Filosofidagarna) with Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund, 2009
- Project leader for The Dynamics of Knowledge which is supported by the Swedish Research Council and involves collaboration with a research group at Hamburg university
- Project leader of Knowledge and Reliability which is supported by the Swedish Research Council and also involves post doc Martin Jönsson
- Initiator and coordinator of Swedish Epistemology Network
Up-coming talks as invited speaker
February: Danish National Congress
April: Lund-Rutgers conference at Rutgers
11-14 May: Conference in Alabama, USA, on "New (and Old) Perspectives on Coherentism"
June: Bled Epistemology Conference in Slovenia
Forthcoming papers
"Ruth Barcan Marcus on Belief and Rationality", forthcoming in a Festschrift published by Ontos Verlag.
"In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem", forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien
"Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem", forthcoming in Social Epistemology
"Coherentism", forthcoming in Routledge Companion to Epistemology
Recent publications
Monograph
Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification, Oxford University Press, 2005.
Self-edited books and special issues
Coherence and Truth: Recovering from the Impossibility Results, special issue of the journal Synthese, Vol. 157, 3 (ed. Olsson), 2007.
Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press, 2006 (ed. Olsson).
The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Studies Book Series 97, Kluwer, 2003 (ed. Olsson).
Belief Revision, special issue of Studia Logica, Vol. 73, No. 2, 2003 (ed. Olsson).
Co-edited books and special issues
Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Springer Verlag, 2010 (eds. Olsson, Enqvist).
Logik in der Philosophie, Synchron Wissenschaftsverlag, 2004 (eds. Spohn, Schroeder-Heister, Olsson).
Pragmatisch denken, Ontos Verlag, 2004 (eds. Fuhrmann, Olsson).
Coherence and Dynamics of Belief, special issue of Erkenntnis, Vol. 50, No. 2-3, 1999 (eds. Halbach, Olsson).
Articles and reviews in international journals
"Knowledge, Truth, and Bullshit: Reflections on Frankfurt", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: 94-110, 2008
"Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, 3: 511-524, 2008.
"Reliability Conducive Measures of Coherence", Synthese, Vol. 158, 3, 2007 (with Stefan Schubert).
"Guest Editor's Introduction", Synthese, 158, 3, 2007.
"Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge", American Philosophical Quarterly 44, 4: 343-355, 2007.
"On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change", Erkenntnis 65, 2: 165-183, 2006 (with David Westlund).
"F.P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism", Dialectica, Vol. 58, No. 4: 549-577, 2004.
“Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXX, No. 1: 98-126, 2005.
“Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Observation and Inconsistency”, Synthese, 135: 119-140, 2003.
“What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XCIX, No. 5: 246-272, 2002.
“Why Coherence is Not Truth Conducive”, Analysis 61: 236-241, 2001.
“Coherence and the Modularity of Mind”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 3: 404-411, 1997.
“Making Beliefs Coherent: the Subtraction and Addition Strategies”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1998.
“Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53: 273-288, 2002.
“Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance: A reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53, 2002.
“Walter Burleys Obligationes als Theorie kontrafaktischen Räsonierens”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, forthcoming.
“The Impossibility of Coherence”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis, Vol. 63, No. 3: 389-414, 2006.
“Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis’s Coherence Argument”, Synthese, (with Tomoji Shogenji), forthcoming.
“Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-trivial Extensions”, Erkenntnis, 57: 135-50, 2002 (with Luc Bovens).
“Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks”, Mind, 109: 685-719, 2000 (with Luc Bovens).
“Providing Foundations for Coherentism”, Erkenntnis, 51, 1999 (with Sven Ove Hansson).
“Levi Contractions and AGM Contractions: a Comparison”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36, No. 1: 103-119, 1995 (with Sven Ove Hansson).
“The Presumption of Nothingness”, Ratio XIV: 203-221, 2001 (with Erik Carlson).
“Is Our Existence in Need of Further Explanation?”, Inquiry, 1998 (with Erik Carlson).
Review of Ambiguity and Logic (Frederick Schick, Cambridge UP), Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 21(1): 161-164, 2005.
Review of The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (red. Paul K. Moser), Theoria, 71 (1): 85-87, 2005.
Review of Why there is Something rather than Nothing (Bede Rundle, Oxford UP), Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2005.
Review of Bayesian Epistemology (Luc Bovens och Stephan Hartmann, Oxford UP), Studia Logica, 81: 443-446, 2005.
Review of Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality (red. José Luis Bermúdes och Alan Millar, Clarendon Press) and of Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality (red. Renée Elio, Oxford University Press), Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 128-131, 2005.
Review of Change, Choice and Inference (Hans Rott, Oxford), History and Philosophy of Logic, 25 (4), 332-334), 2004.
Review of Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (Stephan Hetherington, Oxford UP), Theoria, 70, 106-111, 2004.
Review of Foundations of Bayesianism (red. D. Corfield och J. Williamson, Kluwer), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, 2003.
Review of In Defense of Pure Reason. A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification (Laurence BonJour, Cambridge UP), Erkenntnis 49: 243-249, 1998.
Review of Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic (red. E. Ejerhed och S. Lindström), Studia Logica 66, 2000.
Review of Mild Contraction (Isaac Levi, Oxford UP), Philosophy and Phenemonological Research, forthcoming.
Review of Epistemic Luck (Duncan Pritchard, Oxford UP), Theoria, Vol. LXXIII, Part 2, 2007.
Review of The Rearch of Abduction (Gabbay and Woods, Elsevier), History and Philosophy of Logic, forthcoming.
Other articles (selection)
"Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge", to appear in Epistemic Value, Pritchard, D. et al (eds.), Oxford University Press (co-author: Alvin I. Goldman).
”Meinen und Entscheiden”, in Logik in der Philosophie, Spohn, W., Schroeder-Heister, P., Olsson, E. J. (eds.), Synchron Verlag, Heidelberg, 2005.
”Einleitung”, in Logik in der Philosophie, Spohn, W., Schroeder-Heister, P., Olsson, E. J. (eds.), Synchron Verlag, Heidelberg, 2005.
”The Place of Coherence in Epistemology”, to appear in New Waves in Epistemology, Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Ashgate Publishing.
”Potential Answers – to what Question?”, in Knowledge and Inquiry: The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Olsson, E. J. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2006.
”Levi and the Lottery”, in Knowledge and Inquiry: The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Olsson, E. J. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2006.
”The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi”, in Knowledge and Inquiry: The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Olsson, E. J. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2006.
”The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer”, in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Olsson, E. J. (ed.), Philosophical Studies Book Series 95, Kluwer, 2003.
”Disputation and Change of Belief”, in Medieval Formal Logic: Consequences, Obligationes, Insolubles, Mikko Yrjönsuuri (ed.), Synthese Historical Library, Kluwer, 2000 (with Henrik Lagerlund).
Publications (on-line)
 | The Place of Coherence in Epistemology (to appear in New Waves in Epistemology) »
This paper gives my view on the current state of research on epistemological coherence, focusing on probabilistic approaches. It will appear in New
| | The Impossibility of Coherence (forthcoming in Erkenntnis) »
The paper argues that it is impossible to define a measure of epistemic coherence that is truth conducive, i.e., that is such that a higher degree of
| | Review of Bayesian Epistemology (to appear in Studia Logica) »
Here is a review of a recent book by Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann. The book appeared in 2003 with Oxford University Press.
| | On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change (to appear in Erkenntnis) »
The paper argues that the AGM theory of belief revision and similar theories inspired by a Quinean picture of theory change are in error. Instead, bel
| | Review of Pritchard's Epistemic Luck (to appear in Theoria) »
This is a review of Duncan Pritchard's book Epistemic Luck which appeared in 2005 with Oxford University Press. The review will be published in
| | Potential Answers - To What Question? (forthcoming in Knowledge and Inquiry, Cambridge) »
The paper discusses central aspects of Isaac Levi's decision theoretic approach to induction. It argues that Levi does not have a convincing case for
| | Levi and the Lottery (forthcoming in Knowledge and Inquiry, Cambridge) »
The paper explains and discusses Isaac Levi's decision theoretic solution to the lottery paradox. It argues that the theory leads to counterintuitive
| | Review of Hans Rott's Change, Choice and Inference (forthcoming in Hist. Phil. Log.) »
This is a review of Hans Rott's book Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. The review is forthco
| | Review of Schick's Logic and Ambiguity (forthcoming in Economics and Philosophy) »
This is a review of Frederic Schick's book Logic and Ambiguity (Cambridge UP). The review is forthcoming in Economics and Philosophy.
| | Review of The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (forthcomining in Theoria) »
This is a review of The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul K. Moser (ed.). The review is forthcoming in Theoria.
| | Walter Burleys Obligationes... (forthcoming in Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung) »
This is a defense of the contrafactual interpretation of Walter Burley's theory of so-called obligational disputation. The paper, which is written in
| | F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism (forthcoming in Dialectica) »
I consider two problems in the epistemology of F. P. Ramsey. One concerns his theory of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. The paper is forthcoming
| | The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi (to appear in Knowledge and Inquiry) »
This is the introduction to a book I have edited on Isaac Levi's philosophy. The book is called Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of
| | Guest Editor's Introduction (to appear in Synthese) »
This is the introductory essay to a special I have edited of the journal Synthese. The special issue is called Coherence and Truth: Beyond t
| | Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge (to appear in APQ) »
This paper argues that reliabilist knowledge is more stable than mere true belief. The paper is scheduled to appear in 2007 in the October issue of Am
| | Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism (to appear in PPR) »
This paper is a critical discussion of Peter Klein's attempt to unify two central arguments for radical skepticism. The paper will appear in the journ
| | Reliability conducive measures of coherence (to appear in Synthese) »
This paper defines a notion of reliability conduciveness for measures of coherence. It will appear in a special issue of the journal Synthese. The pub
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Current projects
The dynamics of knowledge: on the empirical adequacy of exact theories of the rationality of scienti »
The purpose of the project is to develop and strengthen an internationally recognized Swedish resear...
Knowledge and Reliability »
The purpose of the project is to investigate the tenability of the reliabilist theory of knowledge. ...
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