In recent years my research has mainly concerned the nature of reasons, the distinction between good, simpliciter and good-for, personal values, and the particular pattern of value analysis known as fitting attitude analysis. Currently I am working on a new metaethical theory (On-Conditionalism). Presented "How to locate value in Moral progress" (Amsterdam); Good and Good-for-and the logical Consequence argument" (Aarhus, Geneve). Some other recent work: * "Locating Value in Moral Progress", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
* “Value Taxonomy”, invited chapter for Handbook of Value, eds. J. Deonna, T. Brosch and D. Sander to appear at Oxford University Press. (forthcoming 2015/16), co-author: W. Rabinowicz
* “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value” invited paper for The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory OUP (2015), eds by I. Hirose and J. Olson.
* “Review of Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, in Dialectica 2014,
* “Motivation and Motivating Reason” (2013) in Svennerlind, Almäng, Ingthorsson (Eds.) Johanssonian Investigations, Ontos Verlag.
* “Good and Good For” (2013) in H. LaFollette (ed), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell.
* “Fitting-attitude analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited” Acta Analytica, 2012.
* "A Critical Précis of Mark Schroeder’s ‘The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons’”, ETHICS/PEA Soup, 2012; co-author W.Rabinowicz.

Books (4)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2011). Personal Value. Oxford University Press.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, Vol. 2. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2004:1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2003). Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 1. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2003:1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (1993). Logic, Facts and Representation – An Examination of R. M. Hare’s Moral Philosophy. Lund University Press.

Editorships (7)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Michael J, Z. (2008). (Eds.) Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, 17. Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., Petersson, B., Josefsson, J. & Egonsson, D. (2007). (Eds.) Hommage à Wlodek; 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz - published as web resource only. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. J. (2005). (Eds.) Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, 17. Springer.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). (Eds.) Patterns of Value- Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 2. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2004:1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2003). (Eds.) Patterns of Value : Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 1. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2003:1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2003). (Eds.) Patterns of Value: Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Egonsson, D., Josefsson, J., Petersson, B. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2001). (Eds.) Exploring Practical Philosophy - From Action to Values. Ashgate.

Articles (18)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. Acta Analytica, 28, 1-17. Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. Discusiones Filosóficas, 13, 95-113. Universidad de Caldas.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen on Schroeder. Ethics at PEA Soup, 1-5. Dan Boisvert, Joshua Glasgow, Douglas Portmore, and David Shoemaker.
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• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen on Way. PEA Soup A blog dedicated to philosophy, ethics, and academia, 1-6.
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• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia, 37, 227-243. Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2009). On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 397-411. Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2008). Love, Value and Supervenience. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16, 495-508. Routledge.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics, 11, 405-435. Springer.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2006). Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons. Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 114-120. Oxford University Press.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). Ett Problem för Hares Superveniensrelation. Sats, 5, 47-58. Walterde Gruyter GmbH.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes. Ethics, 114, 391-423. University of Chicago Press.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2003). Tropic of Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, 389-403. Brown University.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2002). Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers. Journal of Value Inquiry, 36, 463-472. Springer.
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• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2002). Instrumental value – strong and weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5, 23-43. Springer.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2001). Värdefulla Ting. Filosofisk tidskrift, 1, 48-59. Thales.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100, 33-51. Wiley-Blackwell.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (1999). Då-För-Nu Preferenser och Preferensutilitarism. Filosofisk tidskrift, 1. Thales.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (1999). Particularism and Principles. Theoria, 65, 114-126. Thales.

Book chapters (16)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2015). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value. Oxford University Press.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2015). Value Taxonomy. In Brosch, T. & Sander, D. (Eds.) (pp. 23-42). Oxford University Press.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Motivation and Motivating Reason. In Svennerlind, C., Almäng, J. & Ingthorsson, R. (Eds.) (pp. 464-485). Ontos Verlag.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2011). For Kevin's Sake. In Reboul, A. (Ed.) (pp. 1-18), 1. Université de Genève, Faculté des Lettres, Dep de Philosophie.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski, R. & Svensson, F. (Eds.) (pp. 243-257), 58. Uppsala Philosophical Studies.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2008). Buck-Passing Personal Values. In Chan, D. (Ed.) (pp. 37-51). Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2006). Dislodging Butterflies from the Supervenient.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. J. (2005). Introduction to Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2005). A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake. In Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. (Eds.) (pp. 115-130). Springer.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2005). Tropic of Value. In Rønnow-rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. (Eds.) (pp. 213-228). Springer.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). Robert Nozick’s Radical Value Realizationism.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). Some Approaches to Personal Value.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2003). Subjectivism and Objectivism. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2001). L.W. Sumner’s account of Welfare.
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2001). Tropic of Value. In Carlsson, E. & Sliwinski, R. (Eds.) (pp. 263-277), 50. Uppsala Philosophical Studies.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (1998). Moral Realists and Moral Experts. In Carsten, B.-P. & Thomasse, N. (Eds.) (pp. 281-299), 15. Odense University Studies in Philosophy.

Encyclopaedia entries (1)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Good and Good for. Wiley-Blackwell.

Conference contributions (11)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (submitted). Locating Value in Moral Progress.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). The Logical Consequence of a Fitting-attitude.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Watching tennis and counting values.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Dual-reason analyses revisited.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Favouring and Motivating Reasons.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2011). Two Kinds of Good.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2010). Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2008). On for Someone’s Sake Attitudes.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2005). Why Some Value theorists have a Problem with Romantic Love.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2002). Fitting attitudes and Value; the Buck-passing Account.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (1996). Smith's Advice to the Mad Tennis Player.

Reports (2)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (submitted). Sakkunniguttlåtande för filosofiska institutionen, Umeå universitet.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Report for Appointments and Promotions Department, University of Haifa.

Working papers (1)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). Konjunktiva fakta och distinktionen mellan agent-neutrala och relativa skäl. Lunds universitet.
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Reviews (4)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion. Dialectica, 68, 609-614. Wiley-Blackwell.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Scott A. Davison, On the Intrinsic Value of Everything, Continuum, 2012. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 1-4. University of Notre Dame.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). Review of Stephen Darwalls, Welfare and Rational Care. Sats, 5, 171-180. Walterde Gruyter GmbH.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2000). R.M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics. Theoria, 66. Thales.

Miscellaneous (6)

• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). Personal value and the logical consequence of a fitting-attitude.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). 'Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Logical Consequence Argument'.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). "On Schroeder's chapter 10 in Slaves of the Passion".
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Personal and Impersonal Value.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Fitting-attitude analyses and Personal Value.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Two kinds of Goodness.

Supervision at Lund University (2)

• Fritzson, F.-A. (2014). Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory. Lund University (Media-Tryck). Dissertation.
• Brax, D. (2009). Hedonism as the Explanation of Value. Dissertation.
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