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Introduction 1 PLEASURE, PREFERENCE, AND HAPPINESS: VARIATIONS ON THEMES FROM MILL Johan Brännmark Department of Philosophy, Lund University johan.brannmark@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: Mill’s qualitative hedonism has been subject to much debate. It was formulated to strike a balance between classical hedonism and perfectionist conceptions of happiness and many have thought that either it is an abandonment
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BrannmarkJohan.pdf - 2025-12-16
2nd draft Nov 13 2006 Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek Feasibility in Action and Attitudeϕ G. Brennan* and N. Southwood** I Introduction According to the principle of “ought-implies-can”, (OC) A ought to X in C only if A can X in C. There are man
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Brennan&Southwood.pdf - 2025-12-16
Cambridge, September 6 Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek WELL-BEING AND CHANGING PREFERENCES Krister Bykvist Jesus College, Oxford krister.bykvist@jesus.ox.ac.uk ABSTRACT: How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BykvistKrister.pdf - 2025-12-16
The Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities from "Oug Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek AUTONOMY AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUES David Copp University of Florida dcopp@phil.ufl.edu ABSTRACT: An agent is autonomous only if she
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/CoppDavid.pdf - 2025-12-16
It is my duty to (φ from a sense that it is my duty to φ) The Right and the Morally Good: A commentary on the first chapter of Ross’s The Right and the Good Roger Crisp St Anne’s College, Oxford During the twentieth century, it became all but impossible for anyone plausibly to claim that they had carefully read most significant past and contemporary works in philosophy. The focus on ongoing debate
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/CrispRoger.pdf - 2025-12-16
Introduction 1 ON GEACH ON GOOD Sven Danielsson Department of Philosophy University of Uppsala sven.danielsson@filosofi.uu.se ABSTRACT: Some objections to Geach’s claim that ‘good’ is always essentially attributive are discussed and rejected. Fifty years ago, P. T. Geach argued that good is always essentially attributive, never predicative. He thought that every meaningful good- ascription either
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/DanielssonSven.pdf - 2025-12-16
Phil 760 Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek Happiness and Subjective Desire Satisfaction: Wayne Davis’s Theory of Happiness* Fred Feldman University of Massachusetts at Amherst ffeldman@philos.umass.edu ABSTRACT: There is a lively debate about the
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/FeldmanFred.pdf - 2025-12-16
swp0000.dvi Egalitarianism, option luck and insurance markets Marc Fleurbaey∗ August 31, 2006 Abstract It is argued here that individuals should never be held responsi- ble for being lucky or unlucky, so that the notion of option luck is prima facie unacceptable. But applying the Conditional Equality and Egalitarian Equivalence criteria to problems of allocation under risk provides a rationale for
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/FleurbaeyMarc.pdf - 2025-12-16
Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 MUTUAL RECOGNITION, COMMON KNOWLEDGE, AND JOINT ATTENTION Margaret Gilbert Department of Philosophy University of California, Irvine Margaret.gilbert@uci.edu Introduction In this paper I discuss thr
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/GilbertMargaret.pdf - 2025-12-16
ANALYTICITY, MODALITY, AND GENERAL TERMS Kathrin Glüer Department of Philosophy Stockholm University kathrin.gluer@philosophy.su.se Peter Pagin Department of Philosophy Stockholm University peter.pagin@philosophy.su.se ABSTRACT: In his recent paper ‘Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in Possible-World Semantics’ (Rabinowicz 2006), Wlodek Rabinowicz takes on the task of providing a satisfactory de
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Gluer&Pagin.pdf - 2025-12-16
Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek Semantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference∗ Ebba Gullberg ebba.gullberg@philos.umu.se Sten Lindstr̈om sten.lindstrom@philos.umu.se Ume̊a University Abstract Is it possible to give a justification of ou
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Gullberg&Lindstrom.pdf - 2025-12-16
Three Approaches to Finitude in Belief Change Sven Ove Hansson (soh@kth.se) Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden Abstract. Since neither a human mind nor a computer can deal directly with infinite structures, well-behaved models of belief change should operate exclusively on belief states that have a finite representation. Three ways to achieve this without resorting to a finite langua
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/HanssonSvenove.pdf - 2025-12-16
Microsoft Word - Höög Manuscript.doc 1 The Philosophers on the Market Square. Philosophical Modernism from Vienna to Uppsala Victoria Höög Department of Philosophy, Lund University Victoria.Hoog@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: The logical empiricists in Vienna and their Swedish counterparts in Uppsala shared a scientific ethos that underlined the philosophical academics as representatives for universalism,
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/HoogVictoria.pdf - 2025-12-16
Authenticity and identity 1 AUTHENTICITY, IDENTITY, AND FIDELITY TO SELF Sigurður Kristinsson Faculty of Law and Social Science, University of Akureyri sigkr@unak.is ABSTRACT: An ideal of authenticity is deeply imbedded in western culture. Following Harry Frankfurt, authenticity might be characterized as fidelity to the person’s essential nature. This suggestion fails, no matter whether personal i
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/KristinssonSigurdur.pdf - 2025-12-16
Completeness Theorems, Representation Theorems: What is the Difference Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek Completeness Theorems, Representation Theorems: What’s the Difference? David Makinson Dept. of Philosophy, Logic & Scientific Method, London S
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MakinsonDavid.pdf - 2025-12-16
Infinite regress – virtue or vice Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?* Anna-Sofia Maurin Lund University Infinite regress arguments are interesting for several reasons. They feature prominently in the philosophic
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MaurinAnnaSofia.pdf - 2025-12-16
Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 INTENTIONALITY, KNOWLEDGE AND FORMAL OBJECTS Kevin Mulligan (Geneva) §1 Intentionality §2 Correctness Conditions vs. Satisfaction Conditions §3 Knowledge & Facts §4 Knowledge & Values §5 Knowledge v
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MulliganKevin.pdf - 2025-12-16
Buck-Passing and the Buck-Passing and the Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction* Jonas Olson Brasenose College, University of Oxford jonas.olson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk Abstract. According to T.M. Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value, for something to be valuable is not for it to possess value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to tak
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/OlsonJonas.pdf - 2025-12-16
Primary and Secondary Reasons PRIMARY AND SECONDARY REASONS Ingmar Persson Department of Philosophy, Gothenburg University Ingmar.Persson@phil.gu.se ABSTRACT:This paper argues that Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen are wrong in thinking that what they call the ‘Wrong Kind of Reasons’ problem presents a serious problem for the idea that the fact that there are reasons to have a pro-attitu
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PerssonIngmar.pdf - 2025-12-16
Microsoft Word - PeterssonBjorn.doc COLLECTIVE OMISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY∗ Björn Petersson Department of Philosophy, Lund University bjorn.petersson@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: As Virginia Held, Larry May and Torbjörn Tännsjö have argued, it can be plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively, if this would be needed to prevent some harm. O
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf - 2025-12-16
