This seminar will be a so-called pre-read seminar of Elsa Magnell and August Olsen's (LU)  co-authored paper

Apologies and Responsibility 

Abstract: Philosophers widely agree that apologising requires more than merely expressing one’s sympathy: while I can express sympathy for anyone’s misfortunes, I can only apologise for those misfortunes I am responsible for. While philosophers have widely endorsed such a responsibility-requirement on apologies, the requirement itself remains underexamined. This paper aims to remedy this by proposing the following understanding of the Responsibility-Requirement: An apology for φ-ing conventionally implicates responsibility for φ-ing, and it is felicitous only if the apologiser is responsible for φ-ing. This raises the question of what kind of responsibility is required. We argue that apologisers meet the requirement if they are culpably, agentially, or causally responsible for what they are apologising for, and that the Responsibility-Requirement holds for all (individual) apologies. Finally, we discuss what the Responsibility-Requirement entails for the relationship between apologies and forgiveness, remorse, moral wrongdoing, and repeating what one is apologising for. By accepting that we can sometimes apologise for what we are merely causally responsible for, we reach the novel conclusion that we can sometimes properly apologise even if we have not performed any morally wrong action or any action at all. The relationship between apologies and responsibility is much more complex than has previously been assumed.

Welcome to this semester's last Higher seminar in Practical Philosophy,

Toni