In 1963, Edmund Gettier famously questioned the correctness of the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) and thereby determined the agenda of most analytic epistemology during the 1960s and the 1970s. The JTB analysis soon started to be labelled as the ”traditional” one, probably because in his paper Gettier attributed a similar analysis to Plato (in Meno and Theateatus), even though Gettier himself did not qualify the analysis as ’traditional’ at all. The traditional character of the JTB-analysis has been questioned by, at least, the following scholars: Kaplan 1985 argues, among other things, against attributing to Plato a JTB analysis of knowledge, but does not delve any deeper into the history of epistemology. Dutant 2015 considers the traditional character of JTB a ”Legend” and offers an alternative ”New Story” according to which (give or take) the traditional definition of knowledge is that of a belief that carries a mark of truth. More in detail, Pasnau 2017 (After Certainty, CUP) proposes that traditional epistemology is an idealized epistemology which consists in a series of continuations and ruptures of Aristotle’s theory of episteme. Finally, Antognazza 2024 (Thinking with Assent, OUP), proposes instead that traditional epistemology considers knowledge and belief as two different cognitive states that are irreducible to each other, with knowledge understood as assenting with certainty to a thought. Dutant, Pasnau and Antognazza’s efforts have a noteworthy common trait: they consider medieval philosophy superficially at best (however, with perfect awareness that medieval philosophy was crucial for the positions that later philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, took regarding knowledge). The aim of this presentation is to turn to the views on knowledge by a representative figure of the late Middle Ages,Thomas Aquinas, with the aim to determine how his epistemology fares with respect to the proposed histories , i.e. JTB, belief with a mark, idealized epistemology and thinking with assent. First, I try to determine what is B in JTB and if it corresponds to the notion of belief that was predominant in philosophy before JTB. For this I rely on Ayer 1957, among others. I conclude that B in JTB (as in Ayer) emerges as an alternative to earlier understandings of belief (and of knowledge) that Ayer rightly takes issue with and that bear traces of medieval themes. Second, I look for an equivalent of B (as in JTB) in Aquinas, to conclude that it is nowhere to be found. Third, I show why Aquinas’ epistemology is also not correctly accounted for solely as ’idealized epistemology’, ’belief with a mark’, or ’thinking with assent’, even though there is some truth in all these efforts. Fourth, I give a summary account of Aquinas’s epistemology, underscoring the trace of JTB that it contains. I conclude with methodological remarks on the intricate combination of a history of the epistemic phenomena (whatever they might be named) and a history of the epistemic terms (whatever they might name).