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PowerPoint-presentation 2014-03-14 1 Föreläsning 4 Subjektivism & emotivism Enligt Rachels så är ”grundtanken” bakom etisk subjektivism att våra moraliska åsikter grundar sig på våra känslor Samt att det inte finns någonting sådant som objektivt rätt eller fel. Det finns inga moraliska fakta Enligt denna definition så är alltså subjektivism en ontologisk position (nihilism eller möjligtvis idea

https://www.fil.lu.se/media/utbildning/dokument/kurser/FPRA11/20141/Bergstrm_Rachels_4_subjektivism__1.pdf - 2026-06-21

swp0000.dvi Egalitarianism, option luck and insurance markets Marc Fleurbaey∗ August 31, 2006 Abstract It is argued here that individuals should never be held responsi- ble for being lucky or unlucky, so that the notion of option luck is prima facie unacceptable. But applying the Conditional Equality and Egalitarian Equivalence criteria to problems of allocation under risk provides a rationale for

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/FleurbaeyMarc.pdf - 2026-06-21

Authenticity and identity 1 AUTHENTICITY, IDENTITY, AND FIDELITY TO SELF Sigurður Kristinsson Faculty of Law and Social Science, University of Akureyri sigkr@unak.is ABSTRACT: An ideal of authenticity is deeply imbedded in western culture. Following Harry Frankfurt, authenticity might be characterized as fidelity to the person’s essential nature. This suggestion fails, no matter whether personal i

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/KristinssonSigurdur.pdf - 2026-06-21

Kritiskt tänkande i värdefrågor VT14.pptx PROBLEM MED DEFINITIONER (i) För vid: definitionen fångar in för mycket. ”fotboll är en aktivitet där man använder boll” (Jmf. Pingis, Rugby) (ii) För snäv: definitionen fångar in för lite. ”En salong är ett rum där man dricker te” (iii) För vid och för snäv: definitionen fångar inte allt den skall fånga samtidigt som den fångar in saker den inte skall. ”E

https://www.fil.lu.se/media/utbildning/dokument/kurser/FPRA11/20141/Slides_frelsning_2.pdf - 2026-06-21

PRAKTISK INFORMATION VT 2014 VÄRT ATT VETA OM STUDIER VID FILOSOFISKA INSTITUTIONEN I LUND FILOSOFISKA INSTITUTIONEN LUNDS UNIVERSITET 2014 20:E UPPLAGAN 2014 Expedition Expeditionen ligger i rum 103 på första våningen. Här kan du få ut LADOK-utdrag, beställa utbildningsbe- vis, omregistrera dig, hämta ut tentamina, köpa kompen- dier, gamla tentamina och instuderingsfrågor, skriftligen anmäla stud

https://www.fil.lu.se/media/utbildning/dokument/kurser/HTXF04/20141/studentinfo_filosofen_vt2014_LORES.pdf - 2026-06-21

PRAKTISK INFORMATION VT 2013 VÄRT ATT VETA OM STUDIER VID FILOSOFISKA INSTITUTIONEN I LUND FILOSOFISKA INSTITUTIONEN LUNDS UNIVERSITET 2013 18:E UPPLAGAN 2012 Expedition Expeditionen ligger i rum 103 på första våningen. Här kan du få ut LADOK-utdrag, beställa utbildningsbe- vis, omregistrera dig, hämta ut tentamina, köpa kompen- dier, gamla tentamina och instuderingsfrågor, skriftligen anmäla stud

https://www.fil.lu.se/media/utbildning/dokument/kurser/FTEB01/20131/studentinfo_filosofen_vt2013_lores2.pdf - 2026-06-21

It is my duty to (φ from a sense that it is my duty to φ) The Right and the Morally Good: A commentary on the first chapter of Ross’s The Right and the Good Roger Crisp St Anne’s College, Oxford During the twentieth century, it became all but impossible for anyone plausibly to claim that they had carefully read most significant past and contemporary works in philosophy. The focus on ongoing debate

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/CrispRoger.pdf - 2026-06-21

Phil 760 Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek Happiness and Subjective Desire Satisfaction: Wayne Davis’s Theory of Happiness* Fred Feldman University of Massachusetts at Amherst ffeldman@philos.umass.edu ABSTRACT: There is a lively debate about the

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/FeldmanFred.pdf - 2026-06-21

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 INTENTIONALITY, KNOWLEDGE AND FORMAL OBJECTS Kevin Mulligan (Geneva) §1 Intentionality §2 Correctness Conditions vs. Satisfaction Conditions §3 Knowledge & Facts §4 Knowledge & Values §5 Knowledge v

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MulliganKevin.pdf - 2026-06-21

Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek Semantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference∗ Ebba Gullberg ebba.gullberg@philos.umu.se Sten Lindstr̈om sten.lindstrom@philos.umu.se Ume̊a University Abstract Is it possible to give a justification of ou

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Gullberg&Lindstrom.pdf - 2026-06-21

Justifying Rational Planning: on the indeterminacy of pragmatic considerations Justifying Rational Choice: the role of success* Bruno Verbeek Leiden University, Netherlands §1 Introduction The theory of rational choice can be interpreted in several ways. One can regard the theory as a representing the choices of agents. The theory is interpreted as an empirical hypothesis for further research. Alt

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VerbeekBruno.pdf - 2026-06-21

Microsoft Word - PeterssonBjorn.doc COLLECTIVE OMISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY∗ Björn Petersson Department of Philosophy, Lund University bjorn.petersson@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: As Virginia Held, Larry May and Torbjörn Tännsjö have argued, it can be plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively, if this would be needed to prevent some harm. O

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf - 2026-06-21

MERITARIAN AXIOLOGIES AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 MERITARIAN AXIOLOGIES AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE Gustaf Arrhenius Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study Gustaf.Arrhe

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/ArrheniusGustaf.pdf - 2026-06-21

Introduction 1 PLEASURE, PREFERENCE, AND HAPPINESS: VARIATIONS ON THEMES FROM MILL Johan Brännmark Department of Philosophy, Lund University johan.brannmark@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: Mill’s qualitative hedonism has been subject to much debate. It was formulated to strike a balance between classical hedonism and perfectionist conceptions of happiness and many have thought that either it is an abandonment

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BrannmarkJohan.pdf - 2026-06-21

Cambridge, September 6 Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek WELL-BEING AND CHANGING PREFERENCES Krister Bykvist Jesus College, Oxford krister.bykvist@jesus.ox.ac.uk ABSTRACT: How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BykvistKrister.pdf - 2026-06-21

Microsoft Word - SJSI WR-Festschrift2.doc Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 IS HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT A SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUAL CONSENT? Linus Broström & Mats Johansson Department of Medical Ethics, Lund University Department of Philosophy, Lund Uni

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Brostrom&Johansson.pdf - 2026-06-21

If there are positive facts, there are negative facts IF YOU BELIEVE IN POSITIVE FACTS, YOU SHOULD BELIEVE IN NEGATIVE FACTS* Gunnar Björnsson Department of Philosophy, Göteborg University gunnar.bjornsson@filosofi.gu.se ABSTRACT: Substantial metaphysical theory has long struggled with the question of negative facts, facts capable of making it true that Valerie isn’t vigorous. This paper argues th

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BjornssonGunnar.pdf - 2026-06-21

Descartes on Virtue Descartes on Virtue∗ By Lilli Alanen and Frans Svensson (Uppsala University) 1. Introduction In letters to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and Queen Christina of Sweden, as well as in parts of the Passions of the Soul, Descartes provide at least the outlines of an ethical theory.1 Most energy is devoted to the characterization of an ideal of moral virtue, which according to Desca

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Alanen&Svensson.pdf - 2026-06-21

Common sense psychology and scientific explanation Common sense psychology and scientific explanation Frederick Stoutland Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University Fred.Stoutland@filosofi.uu.se ABSTRACT: In his recent book, Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon defends a teleological account of explanations in common sense psychology [CSP], arguing that if such explanations were causal, CSP would b

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/StoutlandFrederick.pdf - 2026-06-21

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 CONSENSUS BY AGGREGATION AND DELIBERATION Richard Bradley Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics r.bradley@lse.ac.uk ABSTRACT: On the face of it both aggreg

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BradleyRichard.pdf - 2026-06-21