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Introduction 1 ON THE FULFILLMENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION Michael J. Zimmerman Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro m_zimme2@uncg.edu ABSTRACT: This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/ZimmermanMichael.pdf - 2025-12-19
Indicative conditionals: the logic of assertion John Cantwell September 25, 2006 Abstract I argue that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having partial truth condi- tions: “If A, B” is true if A and B are both true, false if A is true and B is false, and lacks truth value if A is false. The truth conditions are shown to explain a variety of important phenomena regarding indicative conditi
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/CantwellJohn.pdf - 2025-12-19
Infinite Lotteries, Uniform Probability, and Expected Utility (February 27, 1997) Standard Decision Theory Corrected: Assessing Options When Probability is Infinitely and Uniformly Spread* Peter Vallentyne Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia Originally published in Synthese 122 (2000): 261-290. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted (with two small corrections) with per
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VallentynePeter.pdf - 2025-12-19
Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 Requirements John Broome Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford john.broome@philosophy.ox.ac.uk ABSTRACT: Expressions such as ‘morality requires’, ‘prudence requires’ and ‘rationality requires
https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BroomeJohn.pdf - 2025-12-19
6 Vocabularies of Reason 2025 Pufendorf Lectures Lund University Lecture II Logic and the Structure of Reasons I. Three Versions of a Basic Discursive Bipolarity In my first lecture I introduced the concept of reason relations of implication and incompatibility, motivated by Harman’s argument for the need to distinguish such rational relations from inferential practices. I showed that such consequ
https://www.fil.lu.se/fileadmin/user_upload/pufendorf/Files/Lecture_2.pdf - 2025-12-19
