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Microsoft Word - SJSI WR-Festschrift2.doc Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 IS HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT A SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUAL CONSENT? Linus Broström & Mats Johansson Department of Medical Ethics, Lund University Department of Philosophy, Lund Uni

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Brostrom&Johansson.pdf - 2026-05-01

Common sense psychology and scientific explanation Common sense psychology and scientific explanation Frederick Stoutland Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University Fred.Stoutland@filosofi.uu.se ABSTRACT: In his recent book, Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon defends a teleological account of explanations in common sense psychology [CSP], arguing that if such explanations were causal, CSP would b

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/StoutlandFrederick.pdf - 2026-05-01

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 CONSENSUS BY AGGREGATION AND DELIBERATION Richard Bradley Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics r.bradley@lse.ac.uk ABSTRACT: On the face of it both aggreg

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BradleyRichard.pdf - 2026-05-01

Justifying Rational Planning: on the indeterminacy of pragmatic considerations Justifying Rational Choice: the role of success* Bruno Verbeek Leiden University, Netherlands §1 Introduction The theory of rational choice can be interpreted in several ways. One can regard the theory as a representing the choices of agents. The theory is interpreted as an empirical hypothesis for further research. Alt

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VerbeekBruno.pdf - 2026-05-01

8 EXTERNALISM AND THE CONTENT OF MORAL MOTIVATION Caj Strandberg Department of Philosophy, Lund University and Gothenburg University Caj.Strandberg@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: Michael Smith raises in his fetishist argument an important question: what is the content of the motivational states that account for moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/StrandbergCaj.pdf - 2026-05-01

Introduction 1 ON THE FULFILLMENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION Michael J. Zimmerman Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro m_zimme2@uncg.edu ABSTRACT: This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/ZimmermanMichael.pdf - 2026-05-01

Indicative conditionals: the logic of assertion John Cantwell September 25, 2006 Abstract I argue that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having partial truth condi- tions: “If A, B” is true if A and B are both true, false if A is true and B is false, and lacks truth value if A is false. The truth conditions are shown to explain a variety of important phenomena regarding indicative conditi

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/CantwellJohn.pdf - 2026-05-01

Infinite Lotteries, Uniform Probability, and Expected Utility (February 27, 1997) Standard Decision Theory Corrected: Assessing Options When Probability is Infinitely and Uniformly Spread* Peter Vallentyne Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia Originally published in Synthese 122 (2000): 261-290. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted (with two small corrections) with per

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VallentynePeter.pdf - 2026-05-01

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 Requirements John Broome Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford john.broome@philosophy.ox.ac.uk ABSTRACT: Expressions such as ‘morality requires’, ‘prudence requires’ and ‘rationality requires

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/BroomeJohn.pdf - 2026-05-01

6 Vocabularies of Reason 2025 Pufendorf Lectures Lund University Lecture II Logic and the Structure of Reasons I. Three Versions of a Basic Discursive Bipolarity In my first lecture I introduced the concept of reason relations of implication and incompatibility, motivated by Harman’s argument for the need to distinguish such rational relations from inferential practices. I showed that such consequ

https://www.fil.lu.se/fileadmin/user_upload/pufendorf/Files/Lecture_2.pdf - 2026-04-14